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Foreword 
This report develops a conceptual framework for the assessment of costs and benefits 
associated  with  non-tariff  measures  that  allows  an  evidence-based  comparative 
assessment of alternative regulatory approaches. It was prepared by Frank van Tongeren 
(OECD Secretariat), John Beghin (Iowa State University), and Stéphan Marette (INRA), 






Information  and  product  quality;  standardization  and  compatibility,  economics  of 
regulation,  agriculture  in  international  trade,  trade  policy;  international  trade 
organisations. 
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Executive Summary 
Governments are increasingly called upon to respond to a variety of concerns raised 
by  society  in  many  areas  such  as  the  environment,  animal  welfare  and  food  safety. 
Corrective actions are expected when markets either do not exist or fail and hence result 
in inefficient outcomes. If market solution is not satisfactory, governments have a number 
of options available to intervene, including regulatory, subsidy or tax based measures. 
Responding to some of those concerns is a purely local or national matter with little or no 
incidence on trade or trade policy. But in the case of traded goods, non-tariff measures 
(NTMs)  are  becoming  an  increasingly  important  policy  tool  particularly  against  a 
background of continued trade integration and lowering classical barriers to trade, such as 
tariffs and quotas. 
Imports can carry invasive species such as pathogens, pests, or weeds, foreign to an 
economy‟s ecology. Different trade partners may have different food safety standards and 
institutional capacity to enforce these standards. This may lead to imports of food that do 
not  meet  domestic  requirements.  Imperfect  and  incomplete  monitoring  at  the  border 
where it occurs compounds the health or environmental risk. In countries with ill-defined 
property rights, trade may also encourage unsustainable production of some goods for the 
export market, leading to a deterioration concerning global-commons issues.  
Assessing  the  economic  effects  of  NTMs  poses  significant  challenges.  Many 
technical measures may restrict trade but improve welfare through reduction in negative 
externalities (e.g. through reduced risk of importing pests or diseases) or informational 
asymmetries (e.g. through a label providing to the consumers details on the product). 
Other measures can expand trade as they enhance demand for a good through better 
information about the good or by enhancing the good‟s characteristics.  
Efficiency  costs  of  NTMs  are  hence  much  less  evident  than  the  welfare  losses 
associated  with  tariffs  and  quantity  measures.  They  do  not  necessarily  embody  the 
economic  inefficiencies  that  are  associated  with  classical  trade  barriers,  unless  they 
discriminate  between  sources  of  supply,  and  they  may  be  the  least  trade-restricting 
policies available in the face of market imperfections. It is therefore not clear a priori that 
the trade impacts of regulations are inefficient, or that removal of associated non-tariff 
measures that affect trade would achieve efficiency gains that would exceed the losses 
from weaker regulation.  
The report develops a unified analytical framework to assess the costs and benefits of 
measures for stakeholders along the supply chain: domestic consumers, producers and 
governments, as well as foreign suppliers, and where relevant it can even include foreign 
consumers and governments. Trade effects are part of the assessment, as measures impact 
on  trade  as  conduit  of  the  externality,  but  trade  effects  are  not  the  sole  focus.  The 
analytical  framework  allows  comparison  of  alternative  ways  to  design  measures  and 
discerns  their  trade  and  welfare  effects.  For  example,  an  import  ban  (or  prohibitive A COST-BENEFIT FRAMEWORK FOR THE ASSESSMENT OF NON-TARIFF MEASURES IN AGRO-FOOD TRADE – 5 
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standard) to keep the domestic market free of some undesired product characteristic can 
be compared to allowing trade under the condition that the foreign product be clearly 
identifiable (e.g. through labelling).  
The central notion of the framework is to distinguish those consumers (or producers) 
that are concerned by the negative or positive externality and product attributes, from 
those that are not concerned. The value that concerned consumers attach to avoiding the 
undesired  product  characteristic  is  a  key  variable  in  the  cost-benefit  assessment  of 
measures that address failures affecting consumers. Estimating empirically this value is a 
challenge, but recent advances in consumer economics are promising. On the production 
side, the value of avoiding a failure is directly related to the value of the production loss 
that can occur if the failure remains unabated.  
The cost-benefit framework is essentially a modular partial equilibrium model, with 
demand and supply relationships, that can be calibrated to empirical data and allowing the 
calculation of economic welfare effects. The modular set-up renders the approach flexible 
enough  to  expand  it  with  side  calculations.  For  example,  detailed  estimates  of  costs 
associated with monitoring and enforcement of measures could easily be added, but are 
not  currently  elaborated.  The  report  also  mentions  several  extensions  that  can  be 
incorporated but are not fully discussed, such as non-prohibitive standards where both 
domestic and foreign firms make costly efforts to comply and consumers are to some 
extent able to identify the degree of compliance. Other extensions include entry and exit 
of firms in the face of fixed and variable compliance cost.  
The proposed methodology is operational for comparing alternative policy choices 
like standards, border inspections policy and labelling in an international context. The 
methodology contributes to a more comprehensive welfare analysis of NTMs than that 
offered by looking at trade affects alone. 
Application of the framework to specific issues will need to address limitations of the 
method developed here, especially when human health issues are concerned. For such 
cases, alternative methods have been briefly reviewed in this report and those could be 
applied. The empirical results will depend on the configuration of parameters and on the 
quality of data used. To determine the robustness of the results and to underline the limits 
a thorough sensitivity analysis with alternative assumptions, ranges of parameter values 
and different scenarios can be employed. Showing whether a conclusion is robust under a 
range  of  plausible  parameters  can  be  more  valuable  than  one  single  positive  welfare 
estimate.  
The comparative approach to NTMs allows for the identification of alternative ways 
to address a given regulatory problem. By systematically enumerating costs and benefits 
for  all  the  different  economic  actors  involved,  an  evidence-based  approach  can  be 
followed that yields a solid basis for mutual exchange and identification of least-cost 
solutions.  6 – A COST-BENEFIT FRAMEWORK FOR THE ASSESSMENT OF NON-TARIFF MEASURES IN AGRO-FOOD TRADE 
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A Cost-Benefit Framework for the Assessment  
of Non-Tariff Measures in Agro-Food Trade 
1.  Introduction 
The German Reinheitsgebot (“purity law”) for beer dating back to a Bavarian law 
of 1516 is a well known example of a set of rules that describe how a product meant for 
human  consumption  had  to  be  produced  in  order  for  it  to  enter  the  market.  The 
Reinheitsgebot was partly motivated by concerns about food safety, assuring that the right 
ingredients were used.
1 Four and a half centuries later, the German insistence that beer 
had to be brewed according to this standard had to give way in the interest of freer trade 
on the internal market of the EU. Since the unilateral German standard has been abolished 
consumers can now enjoy beers from other European and non-European suppliers next to 
beer that is still produced under the old Reinheitsgebot.  
This  historical  anecdote  nicely  illustrates  the  issues  treated  in  this  report. 
Regulations  in  the  food  and  agriculture  sector  are  put  in  place  and  enforced  by 
governments in order to address societal interest s where unregulated markets are not 
yielding the desired outcome. Many of the regulations address human health issues; 
others address environmental and animal welfare problems associated with agricultural 
production. As long as the regulation concerns a no n-tradeable good (or service), the 
optimal design of the regulatory measures need not take the interest of foreign parties into 
account. Such was largely the case in the 16
th century beer market in Bavaria, which was 
very localized with very little cross-border trade. However, when the product is tradeable 
across  national  borders,  border  measures  and  behind-the  border  measures  are  usually 
taken to assure that the imported varieties meet domestic requirements. Banning all non-
compliant  products  from  the  domestic  markets,  as  was  the  case  in  the  German  beer 
market before the European Court of Justice ruling in 1987, is one very drastic instance of 
such a non-tariff measure (NTM).  
With increased international integration, trade is increasingly becoming a vector of 
external effects, and governments have responded with a wide array of NTMs to the need 
to safeguard domestic concerns (Levine and d‟Antonio, 2003). Imports can carry invasive 
species such as pathogens, pests, or weeds, foreign to an economy‟s ecology (CABI, 
various).  Different  trade  partners  may  have  different  food  safety  standards  and 
                                                       
1.  Another motivation was to restrict the use of wheat in beer brewing so as to divert wheat into 
bread  production.  Next  to  the  brewing  ingredients  (barley,  hop  and  water)  the  law  also 
regulated the sales of beer in terms of packaging requirements and pricing. Bavaria insisted on 
national acceptance of the Reinheitsgebot as a precondition for German unification under Otto 
von Bismarck in 1871. It became a Germany-wide law only in1907. The controversy over what 
may be called a proper “beer” in Germany continues to the present time. Another motivation 
was to restrict the use of wheat in beer brewing so as to divert wheat into bread production. A COST-BENEFIT FRAMEWORK FOR THE ASSESSMENT OF NON-TARIFF MEASURES IN AGRO-FOOD TRADE – 7 
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institutional capacity to enforce these standards. This may lead to imports of food that do 
not  meet  domestic  requirements.  Imperfect  and  incomplete  monitoring  at  the  border 
where it occurs compounds the health or environmental risk. In countries with ill-defined 
property rights, trade may also encourage unsustainable production of some goods for the 
export  market,  leading  to  a  deterioration  concerning  global-commons  issues 
(Chichilnisky, 1994).  
In  some  instances  in  which  trade  is  the  direct  conduit  of  significant  external 
effects, it may be an option to restrict trade, but some policies are more effective at 
addressing external effects than others. Many technical barriers to trade may restrict trade 
but  improve  welfare  in  the  presence  of  negative  externalities  or  informational 
asymmetries.  Other  measures  can  expand  trade  as  they  enhance  demand  for  a  good 
through better information about the good or by enhancing the good‟s characteristics.  
The different forms of NTMs carry different costs and benefits for different parts 
of  society.  For  example,  banning  non-compliant  beers  from  the  German  market  has 
benefited some domestic beer producers by excluding foreign competition, it may also 
have protected consumers from consuming unsafe ingredients, but it also deprived some 
consumers of access to foreign varieties of beer, once the technology was in place to 
make beer tradeable over longer distances.  
This report develops a framework for a systematic accounting of economic costs 
and  benefits  of  NTMs.  By  looking  explicitly  into  potential  benefits  that  NTMs  may 
generate  through  addressing  various  types  of  market  failures,  this  approach  differs 
substantially  from  the  recent  literature  on  non-tariff  barriers
2, which tends to have a 
narrow mercantilist focus on foregone trade (e.g. Otsuki et al., 2001). The cost-benefit 
framework developed here allows for an economic assessment of different alternative 
ways to address the same market failures. Three broad classes of market failures are 
considered: 1) failures affecting consumers, such as imperfect information related to food 
safety, but also consumer concerns relating to production methods; 2) failures affecting 
producers, such as animal disease outbreaks; 3) global commons issues, usually related to 
the conservation of valuable eco-systems. Finally, we also touch upon the problem of 
limited monitoring of compliance with food standards.  
A unified framework is developed that allows the assessment of economic effects 
of NTMs designed to address these different types of market failures. A central notion in 
this framework is to distinguish those consumers (or producers) that are affected by the 
market failure from those who are not, and to derive a method to empirically measure the 
benefits  and  costs  associated  with  NTMs  for  these  different  groups.  In  practice  the 
distinction between the two groups may be hard to make. On the consumer side, this 
approach  rests  on  insights  from  modern  empirical  consumer  economics  and  on  the 
producer side it incorporates insights from epidemiological studies. 
The framework incorporates different types of consumers distinguished by their 
concern for negative and positive external effects and product attributes. Their concerns 
may depend on the information they have on those product attributes. If domestic and 
foreign products have different product characteristics, some NTMs, such as compulsory 
labelling, can reveal the missing information and lead to a differentiation of consumer 
demand between domestic and foreign varieties. Foreign supply may also be a source of 
                                                       
2.  Note that non-tariff barriers are a subset of the broader concept of non-tariff measures as used in 
this report, since it is not clear a priori whether a given measure in fact constitute a barrier to 
trade.  8 – A COST-BENEFIT FRAMEWORK FOR THE ASSESSMENT OF NON-TARIFF MEASURES IN AGRO-FOOD TRADE 
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negative externalities in production, such as the introduction of invasive species. The 
proposed framework captures those effects and the associated NTMs through their effects 
on  cost  of  production  of  affected  domestic  producers.  The  proposed  framework  also 
addresses NTMs related to global commons issues.  
The  framework  is  modular,  in  the  sense  that  new  elements  with  detailed  side 
calculations can be attached or removed from the main structure without the necessity to 
alter the general logic of the approach.  
The overall objective of the work as defined in the scoping paper OECD (2007a) is 
to  investigate  the  significance  of  NTMs  covering  agricultural  and  food  trade  and  to 
quantify  their  economic  impact.  By  aiming  to  develop  a  framework  for  economic 
assessment  of  selected  non-tariff  measures  initiated  by  governments  in  the  agri-food 
sector in OECD countries, the current report presents a first step towards an evidence-
based approach that will yield a solid basis for mutual exchange and identification of 
least-cost solutions. The present report discusses a conceptual framework to facilitate a 
comparative  assessment  of  different  approaches  to  address  a  given  market  failure  or 
imperfection through regulatory measures that have a bearing on international trade. The 
conceptual  work  is  complemented  by  a  number  of  empirical  case  studies  that  are 
identified  using  a  data-driven  selection  procedure  and  that  highlight  strengths  and 
weaknesses of the conceptual framework. 
The report is structured as follows. We first review the major forms of market 
failures and imperfections in section 2. Section 3 describes policy instruments associated 
with the failures identified in section 2; section 4 describes their trade effects. Section 5 
discusses potential changes in market structure induced by NTMs and associated costs of 
compliance. Section 6 discusses the use of cost-benefit methods compared to alternative 
methods.  A  proposed  modelling  approach  is  presented  in  section 6.  The  remaining 
sections provide guidance on how to empirically implement the proposed framework. 
Section 7 reviews recent developments in valuation of external effects. Section 8 explains 
how  to  implement  the  framework,  which  is  illustrated  in  Section  9.  The  last  section 
provides  a  potential  roadmap  for  further  development.  Several  Appendices  provide 
supplementary  information  on  NTMs  (Appendix 1),  and  the  modelling  approach 
(Appendix 2). 
2.  A taxonomy of market failures and imperfections 
This section discusses the major forms of market imperfections and market failures 
which are relevant for NTMs. Imperfect and failing markets lead to outcomes that are not 
efficient,  and  this  is  an  important  rationale  for  government  intervention.  A  large 
proportion of NTMs attempt to remedy external effects. Externalities occur when some 
agent‟s utility or production depends on the choices made by other agents, who do not 
factor these external effects into their decision making. As a consequence, there are costs, 
or benefits, associated with the externality that fall on some agent but are not reflected in 
market valuations. It is useful to characterize an externality by its point of impact in order 
to organize the discussion. When the external cost or benefit arises in consumption it will 
be  referred  to  as  a  consumption  externality,  while  those  where  the  impact  arises  in 
production  will  be  called  production  externalities.  As  an  example,  consider  harmful 
chemical residues that arise in production, but their possible health impact occurs on the 
consumption side; this type of externality will therefore be referred to as a consumption 
externality.  A COST-BENEFIT FRAMEWORK FOR THE ASSESSMENT OF NON-TARIFF MEASURES IN AGRO-FOOD TRADE – 9 
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Other market imperfections addressed through NTMs relate to the consequences of 
asymmetric  information  (one  partner  in  a  transaction  knows  more  than  the  other)  or 
imperfect information (not all consequences can be known). The informational problems 
can also conveniently be located as occurring at the consumer or producer side. They can 
also play a role in the context of monitoring of rules and regulation by governments. 
The  taxonomy  starts  with  failures  affecting  the  utility  of  consumers;  then  the 
reports looks at their counterparts in production, i.e. failures linked to production. This is 
followed by a discussion of global commons issues, and finally by a treatment of some 
issues related to imperfect monitoring.  
2.1  Market failures affecting consumers  
Externalities affecting consumers: This case involves the creation of a negative 
externality  on  agents  not  associated  with  production  or  consumption  of  the  good. 
Consumers  are  affected  by  the  external  effect  which  is  independent  from  their  own 
consumption  basket.  If  a  good  releases  pollution  during  either  its  production  or  its 
consumption it may affect other persons who are not at all involved in producing or 
consuming that good. Consumer concerns about animal welfare is another example; here 
some consumers (or rather „citizens‟) are concerned about the production methods, their 
welfare is affected regardless their own decisions to consume or not to consume meat 
produced  from  animals  produced  under  certain  conditions.3  Consumers  could  be 
disaggregated into consumers in the importing country and those in the exporting country 
as they may be affected differently. 
Asymmetric  information  and  health,  safety,  or  nutritional  value:  This  type  of 
imperfection is associated with the purchase or the consumption of the good by a final 
consumer. The consumer derives a benefit from consuming the good but also bears a cost 
or benefit not exactly known to him via a health impact. Hence the perceived and true 
social costs of the good differ. If the producer is well-informed about the characteristics 
of  the  good,  a  situation  of  asymmetric  information  prevails.  Some  attributes,  either 
experience or credence attributes, are unknown or uncertain to the consumer at the time 
of purchase and may decrease (as in the case of unhealthy ingredients) or increase (as in 
the case of nutritional benefits) the value of the good. There are also attributes that are 
unsafe  to  consume  and  could  harm  consumers.  Recent  examples  of  cases  where 
asymmetric  information  can  be  associated  with  an  undervaluation  of  health  risks  are 
outbreaks of E-coli and salmonella unknown to some consumers, in either the importing 
or the exporting country  
2.2  Market failures affecting producers  
Externalities  impacting  producers:  external  effects  arise  when  the  production 
process of a good is altered by external forces other than prices. Water pollution may 
impact fishery production for example. The pollution is generated either by consumption, 
production, or trade elsewhere or by the environment itself as in the case of soybean rust 
brought to the US by hurricanes. The resulting impact is a decrease in production or an 
                                                       
3.  This case corresponds to damages from the externality which are “separable” from the market 
consumption. The externality affects the representative consumer‟s welfare but not directly her 
market consumption decision. By convention, economics treats citizens as consumers whenever 
citizens are not producers. 10 – A COST-BENEFIT FRAMEWORK FOR THE ASSESSMENT OF NON-TARIFF MEASURES IN AGRO-FOOD TRADE 
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increase in the cost of production either by loss of efficiency (farm yields fall) or by 
trying to abate the external effects (fungicide applications to eliminate some fungus). 
These occurrences may be non-rival (a whole region is hit by a FMD outbreak) or private 
(a single producer hit by pollution). Occasionally, externalities can be positive, such as 
new imported technological knowledge which is non-rival in the sense that it is available 
to most domestic producers. 
Asymmetric information in production: producers, like consumers, may also suffer 
from asymmetric information and purchase inputs with unsafe attributes (e.g. seed-borne 
disease transmitted to a farmer may induce losses).  
2.3  Global-commons issues  
Global  commons  or  common-pool  resources  refer  to  resources  perceived  as 
belonging to the (global) community and requiring collective stewardship. They are open 
access or common pool resources , for which property rights are not well defined or not 
defined  at  all.  Examples  of  such  global  commons  problems  include  unsustainable 
resource  use  in  forest  products,  depletion  of  fish  stocks  through  over-fishing,  and 
agricultural  production  with  negative  ecological  impacts.  Consumers  do  not  need  to 
consume a specific good themselves to suffer the externality. However, consumers may 
benefit from consuming products certified as respecting the commons. Eco-labels and fair 
trade are well known examples of measures providing perceived benefits to consumers 
with global-commons concerns.  
Although the analytical treatment of global commons cases will often be closely 
related to the treatment of externalities affecting consumers, it is worth distinguishing the 
former  as  an  increasing  number  of  trade  frictions  between  OECD  and  developing 
economies are based on global commons issues and as interest in sustainable practices 
expands. Trade is often central: a good is imported from a source characterized by global 
commons issues or unsustainable practices. A NTM in the importing country may attempt 
to alleviate the global commons problem in the sourcing country.  
2.4  Imperfect monitoring and other government failures 
In  practice,  the  implementation  of  existing  regulatory  policies  can  only  be 
imperfectly monitored and incompletely enforced. In this sense governments are failing 
by not doing enough, and consequently this is sometimes called failure by omission. The 
limited  institutional  capacity  to  monitor  and  enforce  regulations  sometimes  calls  for 
additional interventions, or may necessitate policies that would not be welfare-optimal if 
monitoring were perfect. Mitigating the institutional deficiencies can have strong trade 
implications and bring costly policies. A failure to detect and contain FMD or BSE early 
can induce a collapse of trade if partners are closing borders as an emergency measure. If 
institutional capacity for border inspection is limited, a country might chose to designate 
just one port of entry for imports of certain food products, and this measure can lead to an 
additional trade cost. Other policy responses may be more cooperative when they can be 
planned, especially in the North-South context. For example, coordination of policies 
such as certification of South exporters by importing countries in the North providing the 
additional  capacity  missing  in  the  exporting  country  (e.g. the  EU  assisting  Latin 
American meat packers to meet EU food safety and phytosanitary standards).  
In many countries, full traceability and monitoring may elude the authorities. Even 
the  highly  developed  regulatory  frameworks  in  OECD  countries  cannot  completely A COST-BENEFIT FRAMEWORK FOR THE ASSESSMENT OF NON-TARIFF MEASURES IN AGRO-FOOD TRADE – 11 
 
 
OECD FOOD, AGRICULTURE AND FISHERIES WORKING PAPERS N°21 @ OECD 2009 
prevent  salmonella  and  E-coli  outbreaks.  Theoretically,  optimum  monitoring  should 
equate  expected  cost  and  benefits  of  monitoring  activities,  and  this  often  means  that 
complete monitoring and total prevention would be excessively costly. The ability to 
effectively regulate the agri-food sector is generally more limited in low income countries 
that lack institutional experience as well as financial resources. If there is limited capacity 
to inspect and monitor the resulting “failure of omission” (the government is not doing 
enough) will exacerbate the issue of food safety and global-commons externalities, as 
consumers do not have information on process and product characteristics of the imported 
food they buy. In this context, private standards have emerged to pick up some of the 
tasks. (Fulponi 2006, Garcia Martinez et al., 2007).  
3.  Associated policy instruments 
The market imperfections discussed above can be addressed through a wide range 
of policies, but this report concentrates on those policies that have a potential impact on 
international trade flows, singling out non-tariff measures. In a recent initiative the Multi-
Agency Support Team (MAST)
4 that provides the technical work on behalf of a group of 
eminent persons that has  been charged by the directors general of UNCTAD and the 
WTO with advancing work on non-tariff barriers has developed the following definition 
of NTMs:  
Non-tariff measures (NTMs) are policy measures, other than ordinary customs tariffs, 
that can potentially have an economic effect on international trade in goods, changing 
quantities traded, or prices or both. (MAST, 2008) 
This definition is broad and to a large extent uninformative as was the older nontariff 
barrier category (NTBs), as both NTMs and NTBs are defined residually by policies that 
are not tariffs.  
This broad definition of NTMs does not imply a prior judgment as to their actual 
economic effect, appropriateness in achieving various policy goals, or their legal status 
under the WTO legal framework or other trade agreements. For the purposes of OECD 
work  on  NTMs,  this  has  further  been  narrowed  down  (OECD,  2007a)  by  excluding 
measures that directly impact on prices and quantities (quotas, tariff rate quotas (TRQs), 
State Trading Enterprises (STEs), import licensing and anti-dumping measures), and to 
concentrate on the less researched group of measures that indirectly affect price and/or 
quantity through addressing other attributes of the goods being sold, typically through 
regulatory measures. The next section illustrates what kind of policy measures fall into 
this category. 
                                                       
4.  Institutional members of MAST as of July 2008 are: Food and Agriculture Organization of the 
United  Nations  (FAO),  International  Monetary  Fund  (IMF),  International  Trade  Centre 
UNCTAD/WTO  (ITC),  Organization  for  Economic  Cooperation  and  Development 
(OECD/TAD),  United  Nations  Conference  on  Trade  and  Development  (UNCTAD),  United 
Nations  Industrial  Development  Organization  (UNIDO),  World  Bank  (WB),  World  Trade 
Organization (WTO). Observers: European Commission (EC). United States International Trade 
Commission (USITC), United States Department of Agriculture (USDA). The MAST is jointly 
coordinated by UNCTAD and World Bank. MAST reports to the Group of Eminent Persons, 
which is convened by the director general of UNCTAD. MAST submitted a first report in July 
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3.1  The enlarged MAST classification of NTMs 
The MAST group has developed a new classification system of NTMs, which 
considerably  extends  the  original  TRAINS  classification  used  by  UNCTAD  to 
inventorize trade measures (See section 8 on TRAINS-WITS). A particular feature of this 
new classification is the separate inclusion of categories for SPS and TBT measures as 
well  as  provisions  to  include  procedural  obstacles  (related  to  the  implementation  of 
measures, not the measures themselves). The classification is currently being tested by 
UNCTAD and ITC through pilot studies in seven countries, and the classification is likely 
to be revised in light of the experience gained in the pilot studies
5. The classification 
system is primarily designed to accommodate the exhaustive cataloguing of existing 
policies; it is therefore as much as possible free of prior assumptions about potential 
effects of measures and it is in that sense not an analyti cal scheme. The main groups of 
the new MAST classification are the following (the full list with additional sub-categories 
is provided in Appendix 1): 
A.  Sanitary and phytosanitary measures 
B.  Technical barriers to trade  
C.  Other technical measures  
D.  Price control measures  
E.  Quantity control measures  
F.  Para-tariff measures  
G.  Finance measures  
H.  Anti-competitive measures  
I.  Export related measures  
J.  Trade related investment measures 
K.  Distribution restrictions  
L.  Restriction on post-sales services  
M. Subsidies  
N.  Government procurement restrictions  
O.  Intellectual property  
P.  Rules of origin 
The main headings of the classification of procedural obstacles are:  
  Arbitrariness or inconsistency 
  Discriminatory behaviour favouring specific producers or suppliers 
  Inefficiency or obstruction 
  Non-transparency 
  Legal issues 
  Unusually high fees or charges (e.g. for stamp, testing or other services rendered) 
                                                       
5.  The case study countries are Brazil, Chile, India, Philippines, Thailand, Tunisia and Uganda. A COST-BENEFIT FRAMEWORK FOR THE ASSESSMENT OF NON-TARIFF MEASURES IN AGRO-FOOD TRADE – 13 
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The subset of measures under categories (A) through(C) is most relevant for the 
current report. They have a relatively clear relationship with the market imperfections 
discussed previously. These broad categories also form the core of interventions which 
are on the rise worldwide (Beghin, 2006) and have common allocative effects. They 
increase cost of production via higher marginal cost or larger fixed cost, and they tend to 
affect industry structure. These types of instruments can also enhance consumer demand 
for goods by increasing quality attributes or by reducing informational asymmetries about 
the targeted good. Some of these policies jointly affect both producers and consumers. 
Many of the policies covered by categories (A) through (C) involve considerations of 
institutional capacity. Sometime they address capacity failures of trade partners (failure of 
omission  by  the  exporting  country);  sometimes  they  imply  an  extensive  domestic 
institutional  capacity  to  implement  policies.  Although  different  types  of  requirements 
affect different inputs and stages of production, most of these policies increase cost of 
production either at the margin or via fixed cost. 
The effects of price control measures under (D) are relatively well understood, and 
instruments types included in (E) have been extensively discussed with the analysis of 
quotas, tariff rate quotas and their administration (see for example OECD, 2002a, 2002b; 
Boughner, de Gorter, and Sheldon, 2000). Para-tariff measures included in (F) can be 
analyzed as conventional tax instruments and their incidence is straightforward to derive. 
The latter types of instruments could easily be added to the framework proposed below. 
The  remaining  categories  (G)  through  (P)  are  also  important  but  cannot  easily  be 
integrated in the proposed modelling framework. Procedural obstacles can, however, be 
translated into trade-cost which could be expressed as tariff equivalents in most cases, 
and could in principle be incorporated in to the framework proposed below.  
3.2  SPS measures  
Some  SPS  measures  included  in  category  (A)  address  asymmetric  information 
between producers and consumers of products with credence attributes to ensure that 
buyers know what they buy and that it is safe either for human health or the environment. 
The standards and requirements target process and product attributes. SPS measures also 
address potential externalities in production via invasive species or infectious diseases. 
Most  of  the  SPS  policies  under  category  (A)  imply  a  shift  in  the  marginal  cost  of 
production because additional costs are incurred to meet the requirements. In addition, 
some SPS measures may also increase and enhance demand by providing information to 
consumers. 
Some SPS policies are directly linked to trade as the vector of the externalities. For 
example some interventions target foreign suppliers on a geographical basis. Category 
A280, geographical restrictions, is basically an import ban based on origin. Regulatory 
heterogeneity,  i.e. the  case  where  the  exporter‟s  standards  are  not  in  line  with  the 
importer‟s requirements, leads to a number of SPS measures. Certification requirements 
(A 310) address the institutional setting either domestically or abroad to ensure standards 
are met. A series of subcategories addresses the lack of reciprocity in certification and 
regulation when some standards, including international ones, are not recognized (see 
subcategories covered in A320, Lack of Recognition).  14 – A COST-BENEFIT FRAMEWORK FOR THE ASSESSMENT OF NON-TARIFF MEASURES IN AGRO-FOOD TRADE 
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3.3  TBT measures 
These are regulations and standards targeting technical characteristics of products. 
As  in  the  case  of  SPS,  there  are  voluntary  standards  for  both  process  and  product 
attributes (B100 and subcategories). Both process standards and product standards shift 
cost curves by increasing cost of production, and they can impact positively on demand 
through reduction of asymmetric information between suppliers and consumers. Safer 
products are presumably more attractive to some or all consumers. Unlike SPS measures, 
TBT measures do not include explicit bans on imports from specific countries or regions. 
Technical regulations (B200 and subcategories) cover compulsory standards and 
requirements.  Again  these  concern  product  standards  as  well  as  process  standards, 
presumably shifting supply leftward and demand to the right. These regulations address 
asymmetric  information  and  opportunistic  behaviour  of  suppliers  regarding  credence 
attributes. Traceability and origin of material are included in this category, as are limits 
on residues and restrictions on some substances (B230 subcategory). GMO regulations 
are  another  subcategory  of  B200,  and  so  are  identity  preservation  and  environment-
specific  requirements,  addressing  either  production-based  externality  and/or  commons 
issues. 
Subcategory  B300  covers  conformity  assessment,  certification,  and  testing  of 
products and the cases in which lack of recognition of certification procedures may hinder 
exchange. The latter is more in the realm of institutional or policy failures as discussed 
above.  
3.4  Other technical measures 
The third category of NTMs covers policies and requirements which somehow did 
not fit in the two previous ones but look quite similar to them for analytical purposes with 
some qualifiers. Sub-category C100 covers pre-shipment inspections to check conformity 
of the products, potentially addressing the above mentioned failure of omission; C200 
covers custom formalities not included in (A) and (B). Finally C900 is the residual of last 
resort  (technical  measures  n.e.s.).  These  are  not  obviously  motivated  by  market 
imperfections.  
4.  Trade effects of NTMs  
The  prevailing  economic  approaches  to  analyze  NTMs  often  provide  a  one-
dimensional effect of trade losses without a clear delineation of the link between forgone 
trade and welfare. From the outset, this project is designed to go beyond this type of 
approach and to comprehensively account for welfare implications of policies addressing 
externalities  and  market  imperfections.  Many  NTMs  may  restrict  trade  but  improve 
welfare  in  the  presence  of  the  negative  externalities  or  informational  asymmetries 
discussed above. Other NTMs can expand trade as they enhance demand for a good 
through better information about the good or by enhancing the good‟s characteristics. 
(Maertens et al. (2007); Maertens and Swinnen (2009)). In the presence of disease risks, 
well designed NTMs may allow for some limited amount of trade, while in the absence of 
measures,  such  as  strict  border  inspections  or  restricting  imports  to  products  from  a 
specific country or region within a country, no trade might take place at all.  
There  is  also  an  implicit  presumption  in  much  of  the  existing  literature  that 
harmonization of NTMs is welfare improving. When harmonized, these regulations can A COST-BENEFIT FRAMEWORK FOR THE ASSESSMENT OF NON-TARIFF MEASURES IN AGRO-FOOD TRADE – 15 
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reduce unit cost of production via economies of scale and can guarantee free movement 
of goods on a unified market, such as has happened in the EU. But consumer choice 
might also be reduced if the goods being harmonized are initially differentiated and if 
tastes differ across countries (Moenius, 2006). The case for harmonization is not settled 
yet with no consensus on policy prescriptions emerging from the analytical literature 
(Barrett and Yang, 2001; Casella, 1996 and Gandal and Shy, 2001). Much tension exists 
between theory and applied work in the literature on harmonization of NTMs. Many of 
the empirical assessments have been mercantilist focusing on forgone trade (e.g. Otsuki 
et al., 2001) rather than considering their potential welfare-enhancing effects.  
As trade can be a vector for transmission of an externality, some NTMs directly 
address trade as the source of the externality, such as through a restriction or prohibition 
in the case of an outbreak of infection. Several papers have looked at these restrictions 
with  animal  disease  outbreaks  (Wilson  and  Anton,  2006;  Lee  and  Paarlbergh,  1998; 
Pendell et al., 2007 among others).  
Trade effects of NTMs have been extensively analyzed with the gravity-equation 
approach. Many gravity analyses tend to be broad in scope (multi commodity/sector, 
countries,  and  policies),  which  allows  for  a  broad-brush  investigation  of  general 
hypotheses such as the trade-restricting or expanding effects of NTMs or the impact of 
harmonization. The gravity equation has also been used to look at specific policy issues 
such as the EU aflatoxin policy (Otsuki et al., 2001). Most studies find some evidence of 
trade-impeding  effects  associated  with  technical  measures  using  various  indicators 
(levels, counts, AVE, price wedges). Beyond the well-established trade impeding effects 
of many SPS and TBT measures, trade expanding effects also have been identified, often 
through harmonization and shared standards, in customs unions, and for some goods and 
policies (Disdier et al., 2008; Fontagné et al., 2005; Henry de Frahan and Vancauteren, 
2006; and Moenius, 1999, 2006). A few studies found an absence of trade effects from 
technical  measures  in  some  sectors  (e.g. Fontagné  et  al.,  2005)  and  for  harmonized 
measures (Czubala et al., 2007). Effects of NTMs have also been studied with partial and 
general  equilibrium  simulation  models,  usually  by  parameterizing  them  as  tariff-
equivalent in the import demand (or export supply) functions. See OECD (2008b) for a 
review of quantitative approaches. 
5.  Industry structure and NTMs 
Compliance with NTMs has a bearing on producer costs, both variable (through 
additional  activities)  and  fixed  (through  additional  investments),  and  this  can  have 
important  consequences  for  the  industry  structure.  If  compliance  with  standards  and 
regulations implies large investments that are sunk once undertaken, economies of scale 
become an important characteristic of the industry. Sunk costs related to NTMs may 
become an entry barrier and a decisive determinant of industry structure. Not all firms 
will  meet  the  new  standards  and  the  structure  of  an  industry  can  profoundly  change 
because  of  the  new  production  requirements  to  satisfy  in  the  export  market.  This  is 
leading to concerns regarding market participation in low-income countries in particular. 
Often this unequal ability to meet standards causes dualism in the industry affected by the 
new regulatory environment. A modern and successful segment emerges, whereas smaller 
producers are marginalized and serve an informal domestic market, exit the market or 
become employees in larger firms (Rau and van Tongeren 2007; Maertens and Swinnen 
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The precise effect of the NTM on fixed and variable cost is important: changes in 
variable costs translate into changes in prices, and if all firms have to incur the same 
variable cost change in order to meet the NTM there is no obvious competitiveness effect. 
However, sunk investments do not figure in firms‟ optimal pricing decisions and have 
more indirect effects on market prices through entry and exit of firms. Only firms that are 
sufficiently productive to “jump the hurdle” of fixed market entry costs will be able to 
export (Melitz, 2003).  
Measuring cost of compliance is far from straightforward. Various methods have 
been used: firm-level surveys (e.g. Wilson and Otsuki 2004b), price comparisons (Yue 
et al., 2006; Ferrantino 2006), cost accounting (e.g. Grothe et al., 2000), econometric 
estimations (Antle, 2000; Maskus et al., 2005).  
The  principal  problem  that  needs  to  be  addressed  when  measuring  cost  of 
compliance is the question of the correct baseline, or point of reference. In some cases 
producers  would  have  made  the  production  changes  required  to  meet  importer 
requirements even without standards being in place, or producers make further changes 
not directly necessary to achieve compliance. In these instances it is questionable whether 
the  direct  costs  of  such  changes  can  be  considered  as  compliance  costs.  Additional 
difficulties arise if exporters serve different markets with different requirements, perhaps 
leading to differing compliance costs across markets, and higher total compliance costs 
Harmonization can potentially reduce those costs.  
6.  The use of cost-benefit analysis and alternative methods 
The objective of quantifying the economic effects of non-tariff measures can be 
addressed  as  a  systematic  assessment  of  costs  and  benefits  of  a  hypothetical  policy 
change. The question asked is: „what are likely costs and benefits from changing the 
current policy?‟ The current policy may be a situation of no regulation or no interference 
with the market (do-nothing). The typical problem facing such an assessment is that some 
of the relevant cost and benefit items cannot be estimated with great precision – simply 
because  the  policy  change  is  hypothetical  and  there  are  no  empirical  observations 
available that could reveal reactions of consumers and producers to the new policy set.  
The literature on cost-benefit analysis has developed a number of approaches to 
deal with this particular measurement problem, and they are frequently used as a tool in 
policy making. Several OECD countries, such as Canada, some EU Member States and 
the US, provide official guidelines on how to carry out an exhaustive cost-benefit analysis 
for policy making, especially in the area of regulatory reforms. At the level of the EU 
official guidelines exists for cost- benefit assessments in a number of policy areas that are 
relevant  across  the  entire  EU.  There  are  several  reasons  why  cost-benefit  analysis  is 
widely considered (OECD, 2006c). First of all, it provides a rational basis for decision 
making by forcing the decision maker to consider the beneficiaries and losers of a policy 
change. Secondly, cost-benefit analysis requires any policy to be considered as one of a 
series of options. Thirdly, cost-benefit analysis helps to determine the optimal scale of the 
policy, in the sense of choosing the option that maximises net benefits. Moreover, when 
enumerating  investment  decisions  a  cost-benefit  analysis  explicitly  accounts  for  time 
through a process of discounting.  A COST-BENEFIT FRAMEWORK FOR THE ASSESSMENT OF NON-TARIFF MEASURES IN AGRO-FOOD TRADE – 17 
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Being deeply rooted in the theory of welfare economics the cost-benefit analysis 
takes  individual  preferences  into  account.
6  It  translates  the  theoretical  notion  of 
preferences into an applied measurement of consumer choices through the willingness-to-
pay (or willingness to accept) concept.  Section8  below discusses recent advances in 
measurement of willingness to pay (WTP), and alternative applied methods.  
Despite its appeal, various constraints may impede the realization of exhaustive 
cost-benefit  analysis.  These  constraints  range  from  the  efforts  necessary  to  collect 
information to the occurrence of effects that have an unclear or indirec t impact on 
consumer preferences. But the main constraint is clearly the difficulty to monetize policy 
impacts that save lives. Individuals may be reluctant to place a monetary value, or express 
their willingness to pay, on a life saved. Two alternatives e xist to circumvent the 
impossibility to elicit a willingness to pay in such cases that concern human life.  
The first alternative method, the cost effectiveness analysis, avoids estimating the 
benefits of lives saved. Instead it compares alternatives on the basis of their costs and a 
single quantified, but not monetized, effectiveness measure. The classical example is the 
cost of different measures per statistical life saved (see for instance Morall, 2003). This 
approach  puts  more  emphasis  on  the  assessment  of  costs.  If  it  is  based  only  on  the 
assessment of budgetary costs it may underestimate the full economic costs of a policy 
move.  
The  second  alternative  method  is  the  QALYs  (Quality  Adjusted  Life  Years) 
approach, which is generally used in the medical and public-health field. The costs of 
alternative policies are compared to the health changes, measured over two dimensions: 
the  quality  of  life  (morbidity)  and  the  length  of  life  (mortality).  Several  alternative 
methods exist for estimating the costs of mortality and morbidity and evaluating in money 
terms  the  benefits  of  government  action  resulting  in  a  reduction  of  sanitary  risk. 
Statistical dose-effect methods are used to estimate the risk reduction. With the human 
capital method, a value is placed on the reduced risk of premature death based on an 
evaluation of discounted labour income flows. For an individual of a given age, the value 
of the statistical life prolonged by a regulation corresponds to the discounted sum of the 
mathematical expectation of the person‟s revenues (Freeman, 1993). With the cost of 
illness method, a value is placed on the reduced morbidity resulting from a regulation, 
based on an estimate of medical costs and productivity losses due to illness (Buzby et al., 
1996). Opportunity costs from investing in activities that reduce the risk are included in 
the value of reduced illness (Landelfeld and Seskin, 1982). The main drawback of these 
approaches is their inability to reflect consumers‟ responses in demand and their indirect 
impact on producers. The costs estimated through QALYs methods are not mapped into 
demand adjustments linked to reactions of consumers. Consequently, they cannot take 
into  account  market  price  reactions  and  their  concomitant  impact  on  producers  and 
consumers.  
QALYs  are  generally  used  in  the  medical  and  public-health  field,  while  WTP 
methodologies are the main instruments in transportation and environmental economics. 
See Hammitt (2002) for discussion and comparison of underlying key advantages and 
drawbacks of these two alternative approaches. For the analysis of NTMs both methods 
could in principle be used, depending on the specific case at hand. The CBA framework 
                                                       
6.  Some may see this as a weakness rather than strength of cost-benefit analysis, because it implies 
that preferences should count, even if the holders of these preferences are not well informed. For 
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with WTP measures can most efficiently be used if the market failure issues linked to 
NTMs relate to quality aspects that cannot be translated into clearly identifiable short-
term  illness  (such  as  the  preferences  for  animal  welfare,  the  origin  of  products,  the 
protection of endangered species, negative preferences for GMOs).  
Whatever method is used, there will always be limits to the precision and the scope 
of the measurement of costs and benefits. The use of different models that explain the 
same phenomenon may lead to different results. One way of dealing with that problem is 
to evaluate each model separately and then compare their results, perhaps by taking into 
account  probabilities  with  which  each  model  predicts  its  outcome  (see  for  example 
Treasury Board of Canada, 2007). 
7.  Cost-benefit framework: a modular approach 
This section introduces a framework to systematically assess costs and benefits of 
NTMs addressing the external effects and market imperfections discussed previously. The 
theoretical  framework  is  designed  to  be  applied  with  empirical  data  to  facilitate  a 
quantitative cost-benefit analysis. The objective of this section is to outline a common 
approach and its intuition. Not each and every potential effect is discussed here, as the 
framework  may  be  easily  extended  in  many  directions  to  analyze  particular  trade 
problems.  One  element  not  elaborated  here,  but  which  can  be  important  in  practice, 
concerns costs related to administration, monitoring and enforcement.  
The proposed framework is geared towards welfare analysis that can be calibrated 
and quantified based on information on real policy situations. The framework allows for a 
comparative analysis of welfare effects of different alternative ways, different NTMs, to 
address the same type of market imperfections. This is illustrated here by looking at only 
three polar cases: free trade; a prohibitive standard or an import ban; and free trade with 
labelling.  
The framework comprises “modules” for calculation of cost and benefits affecting 
(a) domestic  consumers,  (b)  domestic  producers,  (c)  domestic  government,  and 
(d) foreign  producers.  For  simplicity,  foreign  consumers  and  governments  are  not 
included here. In addition, the different actors in the supply chain (farmers, processors, 
retailers  etc.)  are  collapsed  into  a  single  production  stage  representing  supply.  These 
abstractions influence results in many cases but are maintained here to preserve clarity in 
exposition. The framework distinguishes the external costs and benefits to various agents 
induced by failures and then cost and benefits to the same agents induced by policies 
imposed to remedy the failures. 
A key feature of the framework is to distinguish those agents who are concerned 
by  a  given  market  imperfection  from  those  that  are  not.  On  the  consumer  side,  this 
involves distinguishing those consumers who have a preference for certain characteristics 
of the good in question (or a preference for avoiding certain undesirable characteristics) 
from those who are not concerned. This distinction may be difficult to make in practice, 
but  will  be  vital  in  achieving  an  accurate  outcome.    Recent  advances  in  consumer 
economics, and in particular experimental economics, offer ways to partition consumers 
into various groups by observing their choice behaviour. Similarly, on the producer side, 
a distinction is made between those who are affected by a producer based externality 
from those who are not. The exposition introduces a minimum of technical detail. The 
full derivations and calculations of welfare effects can be found in Appendix 2.  A COST-BENEFIT FRAMEWORK FOR THE ASSESSMENT OF NON-TARIFF MEASURES IN AGRO-FOOD TRADE – 19 
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Table 1.Cases of NTM Analysis 
Market failure  Policy and  
regulatory regime 




1) Prohibitive standard or 
import ban 
No competition from foreign producers Autarky but high quality. 
Unconcerned consumers buy “too much quality”. 
Price paid is high with no imports. 
2) Free trade (no label)  Foreign producers enter; larger supply, product is undifferentiated. 
Consumers benefit from unique lower price; domestic producers lose from competition and lack of label. 
Concerned consumers lose from imperfect information, lower average quality. 
3) Free trade and 
mandatory label 
Goods and demands are differentiated; 2 equilibrium prices. 
Each consumer type can consume preferred product. 
Consumers benefit from competition in supply. 
Domestic producers have higher profit with higher price thanks to label. 




4) Prohibitive standard or 
import ban 
The prohibitive standard or import ban precludes imports of foreign units that can contaminate domestic supply. No externality in 
production. 
Demand is independent of the externality. 
5) Free trade (no label) 
 
Foreign supply (imports) contaminates domestic production. Pivot of the domestic supply curve from higher cost of production 
induced by externality. Total supply meets demand at lower price. Consumers gain as the price is lower than under autarky. 
Domestic producers lose from lower price and higher cost. 
6) Free trade & 
mandatory label 
 
Not analyzed here. A non-prohibitive standard could eliminate the externality, would increase the unit cost of foreign suppliers. 
Consumers would benefit from the competition in supply. Producers would lose from competition but not from higher cost. The 





7) Prohibitive standard 
 
Conceptually similar to case one when consumers do not have the information on the negative attributes. No feedback effect on 
demand because externality is separable from consumption. The prohibitive standard eliminates the domestic part of the 
externality but not the part generated outside of the country. Welfare improves as the externality is smaller. Price paid is relatively 
high.  
8) Free trade (no label) 
 
Concerned consumers are not informed about the link between consumption and externality. Externality expands. 
No feedback from the externality on demand. Free trade lowers the price paid but expands the externality.  
Domestic producers lose; domestic consumers gain from lower prices but some consumers lose from expanded externality.  
9) Free trade & 
mandatory label 
Not analyzed in this report. No feedback on demand but separable externality decreases as unit purchases have to meet the 
standard linked to the label. If label is costly at the margin, supply pivots leftward and equilibrium price is higher. Potential free-
rider problem.  

















Conceptually similar to consumer-based externalities (case 1) but even with proper policy and fully informed concerned 
consumers, externality remains as some goods purchased by unconcerned consumers or in other countries will contribute to the 
global externality. Potential free-rider problem. 
 
Firms exert effort to abate the negative externality with some sunk and marginal cost of effort. Higher marginal cost is passed on 
to consumers. A relatively large sunk cost influences the number of domestic and foreign firms (via entry and exit). 20 – A COST-BENEFIT FRAMEWORK FOR THE ASSESSMENT OF NON-TARIFF MEASURES IN AGRO-FOOD TRADE 
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An  important  simplification  is  made  in  order  to  keep  the  exposition  as 
straightforward as possible. In the discussion below it is assumed initially that the only 
source  of  the  market  failure  is  foreign  and  that  the  domestic  economy  is  free  of  all 
production and consumption failures. Implicit in this approach is the assumption that 
domestic producers and consumers have fully adjusted their behaviour to internalize all 
externalities  that  might  previously  have  existed,  perhaps  in  response  to  domestic 
regulation.  This  simplification  is  merely  introduced  in  order  to  keep  the  exposition 
tractable. It is relaxed later to analyze the more common case where both domestic and 
foreign  producers  are  subject  to  production  requirements  (mandatory  or  voluntary 
standards), but domestic and foreign suppliers have to make different efforts to meet the 
different requirements on different markets. It is of course conceivable that the externality 
could  originate  domestically  and  be  exported  by  the  domestic  country.  Positive 
externalities  are  also  possible,  such  as  technology  transfers.  These  cases  are  not 
considered  here  but  could  be  accommodated  in  the  framework.  The  following  table 
summarizes the cases distinguished and highlights the main results.  
7.1  Market failures affecting consumers 
The market good being analyzed is assumed to be homogenous (i.e. same quality 
attributes)  except for  a specific  characteristic  that  differs  according to the  country  of 
origin. We assume that foreign producers offer a good with a specific characteristic (an 
environmental  or safety  risk  or  a  specific  process  of  production)  that  some  domestic 
consumers  do  not  want  or  do  not  favour,  while  the  other  domestic  consumers  are 
indifferent.  This  assumption  matches  the  prevailing  practice  in  which  a  regulation  is 
supposed  to  protect  some  concerned  domestic  consumers  regarding  a  characteristic 
conveyed by foreign products. This is clearly a simplification, as it is likely the case that 
both domestic and foreign producers are subject to mandatory standards in their home 
economies.  However,  this  analytical  simplification  allows  a  sharper  focus  on  the 
implications of differing requirements between countries, reflecting differences in what is 
considered  appropriate  product  characteristics.  Given  these  differing  requirements, 
different  levels  of  effort  are  required  by  domestic  and  foreign  firms  to  comply  with 
production requirements in different markets.  
It  is  assumed  initially  that  foreign  producers  are  not  able  to  correct  this 
characteristic or to reduce the externality linked to the good they offer. Except for the one 
special characteristic, all consumers have the same preferences regarding the direct utility 
linked to the product. The characterization of preferences largely follows Polinsky and 
Rogerson (1983). Demands are derived from quadratic preferences, and supply is derived 
from a quadratic cost function. Turning first to consumer preferences, demand of each 
consumer i={1,…,N} is derived from a quasi- linear utility function that consists of the 
quadratic preference for the market good of interest and an additive numeraire: 
2 ( , ) /2 i i i i i i i i U q w aq bq Ir q w     ,  (1) 
where the term 
2 /2 ii aq bq   is the immediate satisfaction of consumer i from consuming 
a quantity  i q  of the good and  i w  is the numeraire good consumed by i. For simplicity 
, ab  are the same for the N consumers.  
The effects of externalities and information are captured by the term  ii Ir q  . The 
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characteristic brought by the foreign product. If consumers are not aware of the specific 
characteristic or if there is an unaccounted externality linked to the specific characteristic, 
then I=0.Conversely, I=1 means that consumers are aware of the specific characteristic 
and can unambiguously identify the foreign product or they internalize the externality and 
reduce their consumption. The perceived damage associated with the consumption of the 
good with the specific characteristic is denoted ii rq  .  
The maximization of the utility function under a budget constraint yields a demand 
function for each consumer. Aggregate demand for the good is obtained by summing 
individual  demand  functions  over  all  N  consumers.  However,  total  demand  can  be 
partitioned into two groups: those who are indifferent and those who are concerned about 
a  specific  characteristic  of  the  good  (see  appendix  2  for  details).  Let  the  proportion 
β=N1/N of consumers be completely indifferent to the specific characteristic, with  0 i r   
for every i=1,.., N1. In other words, they attach no damage value to consuming the good. 
The remaining proportion (1-β)= 1-N1/N of concerned consumers is reluctant to consume 
the specific characteristic and associates a damage per unit consumed equal to  2 i rr   for 
every  i=  N1+1,..,  N 
7. With  / b b N  ,  the  (inverse)  demand  functions  for  the  two 
subgroups become:  
1
22
( ) ( / )                            indifferent consumers
( , ) [ /(1 )]          concerned consumers
D
D
p Q a b Q





     
  (2) 
Note that this specification is a mixed version of horizontal product differentiation (at the 
same  price  consumers  are  indifferent  between  a  product with  the  characteristic  and  a 
product without the characteristic) and vertical product differentiation (at the same price 
concerned  consumers  unanimously  choose  the  product  without  the  negative 
characteristic).  For  food  safety,  if  consumers  unanimously  pre fer  safe  food,  the 
specification can be captured with a full vertical product differentiation model where the 
proportion of indifferent consumers is β=0. 
8 
On the supply side, a perfectly competitive industry with price taking firms is 
assumed for both domestic and foreign supplies.  There are MO domestic firms and MF 
foreign firms. Firms‟ cost functions are quadratic in output, and they are choosing output 
to maximize profits:  
2 1
2 sj sj s sj s pq c q K      for j={1,…,Ms}; s= {O, F}  (3) 
                                                       
7.  The case where consumers attach a positive value to the characteristic is completely symmetric. 
It is captured by taking a negative value for r2. 
8   The demand functions given by (2) are linear, which is obviously a simplification. An alternative 










    , where   is 
the information elasticity and   is the price elasticity of demand. The welfare estimations under 
both specifications are close when the price elasticity of demand is relatively low, which is often 
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where  s c  is the variable cost parameter and  s K  is the sunk cost linked amongst others to 
the firm‟s market entry and compliance with regulations. The profit maximization yields 
individual firm supply functions which can be added up to yield industry supply Q 
9:  
 
( ) /        inverse domestic supply
( ) /        inverse foreign supply
S
O O O O O
S
F F F F F
p Q c Q M
p Q c Q M


  (4) 
The total inverse supply defined by the sum of foreign and domestic supply is 
( )        inverse overall supply
S O F O
O F O
O F F O
ccQ
pQ
c M c M
 

  (5) 
For the rest of the analysis it is assumed that  OF cc , which means that domestic 
producers  incur  higher  marginal  cost  than  foreign  producers. This  reflects  a  situation 
where domestic production incurs a costly effort to eliminate the specific characteristic 
(an environmental/safety  risk  or a  specific  process of  production) that some  domestic 
consumers do not want, while foreign producers do not have to bear these addition al 
costs. Alternative assumptions are easy to accommodate in the framework. To simplify 
further it is assumed initially that sunk costs  O K  and  F K  are equal to zero; this means 
that firm exit and entry can be ignored. This assumption will be relaxed subsequently.  
Three regulatory configurations are compared in the sequence: (i) a prohibitive 
standard impeding foreign products with the given characteristic (equivalent to an import 
ban), (ii) a free trade situation and (iii) a free trade situation with a mandatory labelling 
regarding the negative characteristic offered by foreign firms. The case with a positive 
label on the domestic product to signal the absence of the undesired characteristic is not 
detailed here, but the results would be technically similar to the situation (iii) where only 
the foreign product is labelled.  
Prohibitive standard 
The autarky situation brought about by a prohibitive standard is the easiest case to 
analyze. In this case, the overall domestic demand collapses to just one function, since the 
foreign  product  is  simply  not  available.  Figure  1  shows  domestic  demand  (D)  and 
domestic supply (SO). The price is located on the vertical axis and the quantity is shown 
along  the  horizontal  axis.  With  zero  imports,  there  is  a  single  equilibrium  price  p
A 
clearing the market by equalizing demand and supply with an equilibrium quantity  A Q  
(such that  ( ,0) ( )
D A S A
O p Q p Q  ).  
The profits of all domestic producers correspond to area OAp
A in Figure 1, and the 
surplus of domestic consumers corresponds to area Ap
Aa. Total domestic welfare is the 
sum  of  consumer  and  producer  surplus  and  given  by  area  OAa.  Full  analytical 
expressions  for  equilibrium  values  of  prices  and  quantities  as  well  as  for  all  the 
components of welfare are provided in Appendix 2. 
                                                       
9.  Individual  supply  functions  are  only  defined  for  prices  exceeding  average  costs,  because 
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The case opposite to prohibited imports is free trade. This situation is represented 
in Figure 2, where the previous situation under autarky is now represented with dashed 
lines. Opening borders to foreign products (with a supply denoted SF,) changes the market 
allocation. The overall supply is represented by SO+ SF in Figure 2.  
On  the  demand  side,  recall  that  a  proportion  β  of  consumers  is  completely 
indifferent  between  domestic  and  foreign  products,  since  these  consumers  are  not 
concerned by the additional characteristic brought by the foreign producer. This subgroup 
has an overall demand D1. A proportion (1-β) of consumers is concerned by foreign 
products (for instance for safety/environmental, ethical, social reasons). Their willingness 
to  pay  for  a  given  quantity  decreases  by  r2  for  products  with  the  given  negative 
characteristic.
10 Therefore, the demand by concerned consumers becomes  2 D   (defined 
by 2 ( ,1)
D pQ ). 
For this free trade configuration without labels, the overall demand is  12 DD    in 
Figure 2. The per-unit damage r2 implies a kink in the aggregate demand schedule at the 
point v in Figure 2. Under this configuration, there is a single market clearing price, since 
                                                       
10.  Consumers‟ knowledge is simplified: we abstract from search or experience strategies. We also 
abstract  from  quality/safety  signaling  (via  brand  investment  or  guarantee)  and/or  firm‟s 
reputation in a context of repeated purchases under imperfect information. Rational expectations 
about  quality  require  consumers  to  know  all  parameters  (common  knowledge)  in  signaling 
models.  This  requirement  is  unrealistic  when  technical  expertise  is  required  to  know  some 
attributes. 24 – A COST-BENEFIT FRAMEWORK FOR THE ASSESSMENT OF NON-TARIFF MEASURES IN AGRO-FOOD TRADE 
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the  absence  of  information  about  the  product  characteristic  makes  it  impossible  to 
distinguish the two qualities and to segment the market. Market clearing leads to the 
equilibrium  price  p
B  such  that  demand  equalizes  supply  and  determines  equilibrium 
quantity 
B Q .  


















2 (1 )( ) ar
b










The profits of domestic producers correspond to area Oxp
B in Figure 2. Clearly, 
domestic  firms  earn  less  profits  compared  to  autarky:  Oxp
B  <  OAp
A.  The  surplus  of 
domestic consumers corresponds to area p
BBva, and total domestic welfare is given by 
area OxBva. The profit for foreign producer is OxB. Clearly, foreign producers benefit 
from trade liberalization compared to autarky with zero profit.  
Figure 2 also depicts the changes in domestic welfare when shifting from autarky 
to free trade. Two opposite effects can be identified. The first one is caused by imperfect 
information for the proportion (1-β) of concerned consumers who are reluctant to buy 
foreign products. Since these consumers cannot differentiate between the two types of 
goods, they decrease their demand at any given price and their surplus decreases. The 
second effect is the decreasing price effect coming from the supply increase linked to the 
foreign producers‟ entry.  
The  effect  of  trade  liberalization  on  the  domestic  country,  i.e. the  comparison 
between  the  welfare  OAa  under  autarky  and  the  welfare  OxBva  under  free  trade  is 
ambiguous. If area xBw is larger than area vaAw, the decrease in price is large enough for 
trade liberalization to be beneficial to the domestic country. Alternatively, area xBw could 
be lower than area vaAw, when trade liberalization involves a relatively large decrease in 
the demand by the proportion (1-β) of concerned domestic consumers. In this case trade 
liberalization would result in welfare losses, for the domestic country, and a trade ban A COST-BENEFIT FRAMEWORK FOR THE ASSESSMENT OF NON-TARIFF MEASURES IN AGRO-FOOD TRADE – 25 
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linked to a standard that impedes foreign products with the specific characteristic would 
be preferred from a domestic point of view. Foreign producers will be injured by such a 
decision with a loss equal to OxB. 
Free trade with a mandatory label 
The free trade option may lead to a decrease in domestic welfare if the proportion 
of concerned consumers is large enough and, because of imperfect information about the 
good‟s  characteristics,  they  reduce  their  demand  sufficiently  to  offset  the  benefits 
obtained through cheaper imports. The third configuration combines free trade with a 
mandatory label that perfectly signals the negative characteristic linked to the foreign 
product. For simplicity, this label is understood by all consumers and fully transmits the 
relevant information to consumers.
11 To simplify further, it is assumed here that labelling 
is costless; an assumption that can easily be relaxed.   Labelling makes it possible to 
segment the market into two varieties: one foreign variety that contains the characteristic 
that  is  disliked  by  some  consumers  and  the  domestic  variety  that  is  free  of  the 
characteristic. It is assumed that the segmentation is perfect and that no arbitraging sales 
between the two segments can occur. The foreign supply  SF  is  now  represented  in 
Figure 3. The previous situation under free trade without label is now represented with 
dashed lines (with the previous equilibrium situation at point B). 
Figure 3. Consumption externality, mandatory label 
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b  (1 )a
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11.   Wansink et al. (2004) analyze the limitations of labels to convey information.  Some quality 
characteristics described in labels may be difficult for consumers to understand. Some labels 
may confuse consumers and tarnish the credibility of “better” labels.  26 – A COST-BENEFIT FRAMEWORK FOR THE ASSESSMENT OF NON-TARIFF MEASURES IN AGRO-FOOD TRADE 
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With labelling there are two prices clearing the market, since the label makes it 
possible to identify the two qualities by segmenting the market. The proportion (1-β) of 
concerned consumers may now turn to the domestically-produced product without the 
negative  characteristic,  so  that  the  demand  D2  is  the  same  as  under  autarky 
with 2 ( ,0)
D pQ .  
The  first  equilibrium  price  1
L p   equalizes  1 ()
D pQ and ()
S
F pQ ,  where  foreign 
products are bought by the proportion β of indifferent consumers searching for the lowest 
price. The indifferent consumers‟ surplus is  11
L p L a and the foreign producers‟ profits 
are 11 0
L pL. The second equilibrium price  2
L p  equalizes  2 ( ,0)
D pQ and ()
S
O pQ , where the 
domestic products are bought by the proportion (1-β) of concerned consumers who avoid 
foreign  products.  The  concerned  consumers‟  surplus  is  22
L p L a   and  the  domestic 
producer‟s profits are 22 0
L pL. Domestic producers increase their profits compared to the 
free trade situation without label (the profit was0
B px ). 
Domestic  welfare  is  area  1 1 2 0
L p La L a    in  Figure  3.  Under  this  third  policy 
scenario, welfare is greater than that obtained under free trade without labelling measured 
by OxBva. The labelling policy allows higher profits for domestic firms and more product 
diversity  for  consumers.  The  latter  is  welfare  improving  compared  to  the  free  trade 
situation without the label. From the consumers‟ point of view, this situation is the best 
one, since a label provides information and trade liberalization helps to decrease prices.  
The profit for foreign producers with labelling is  11 0
L pL, which is clearly lower 
than  the  welfare  0
B py   obtained  under  free  trade  without  a  labelling  requirement. 
Imposing  a  mandatory  label  is  controversial  between  the  two  countries  as  foreign 
producers would lose some profits.  
The welfare conclusions emerging from the above analysis depend obviously on 
the  configuration  of  parameters.  Demand  elasticities  and  the  size  of  the  consumer‟s 
valuation of the externality (r2), determine the final assessment, and these will have to be 
determined empirically. Also, if domestic firms happen to have lower marginal cost then 
foreign suppliers, and can hence offer their product at lower prices than foreign suppliers, 
even non-concerned consumers will be tempted to buy domestic. Such cost differences 
can also be the result of the policy itself. 
Obviously, the label enforcement leads to private and public costs related to the 
certification of products and production facilities, identity preservation and the promotion 
of  the  label  (see  Bureau  et  al.,  1998).  Labelling  also  increases  production  costs,  as 
production and packaging processes have to be altered (for the example of costs and 
benefits  of  country  of  origin  labelling  for  fruit  juices  see  Centre  for  International 
Economics (2006)). If these costs are not “too” high (not prohibitive), the government 
will find it optimal to impose the label.  
The incidence of labelling costs is a complicating factor. The optimal partitioning 
of costs between consumers, taxpayers, producers and the government depends on the 
nature  of  inspection  and  certification  costs  (see  Crespi  and  Marette,  2001).  If  both 
domestic and foreign firms incur the same inspection and certification costs that depend 
on quantities, economic theory suggests that they are factored into consumer price. In this A COST-BENEFIT FRAMEWORK FOR THE ASSESSMENT OF NON-TARIFF MEASURES IN AGRO-FOOD TRADE – 27 
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case, there is a parallel upward shift of both supply curves SO and SF in Figure 3. In 
contrast, if firms incur inspection and certification costs that are sunk, these costs are not 
directly incorporated in the price and firms cannot pass them on to consumers. Some 
firms may exit the market until the remaining firms break even with a higher market price 
at the new equilibrium. In this case, both supply curves SO and SF rotate towards the 
vertical axis in Figure 3. In this case the analysis should track the respective number of 
domestic and foreign firms. Whatever the type of cost, the higher the cost of certification 
and inspection is, the lower the benefit of imposing a mandatory label. 
The potential for controversy between countries when considering policy options 
is exacerbated when investment costs are borne by foreign producers. Indeed, as these 
costs are not passed on to consumers directly in the price, it is optimal for a government 
to shift the sunk costs of labelling to foreign producers. A prohibitive cost may deter 
foreign producers from entering the domestic market and may become a trade barrier. 
The labelling policy analyzed in this example did not discuss the type of label. 
Information  about  product  characteristics  can  be  provided  in  the  form  of  “negative” 
labelling that marks a product as containing characteristics that are not desired by some 
consumers.  Alternatively,  “positive”  labelling  highlights  in  an  affirmative  way  the 
compliance with a production standard. For the logic of the analysis pursued here the 
distinction does not matter, as long as the consumer is able to fully distinguish between 
different product varieties, but in terms of implementing a labelling policy there may be 
important differences between the two approaches. Consumers may react differently to a 
negative signal compared to a positive one.  
7.2  Market failures affecting producers  
Production-based  failures,  such  as  animal  or  plant  disease  outbreaks,  can  be 
conceptualized as a negative shock on supply as shown in Figure 4, inducing a shift or a 
pivot of the marginal cost curve. This follows Orden and Romano (1996), Wilson and 
Anton (2006), and Peterson and Orden (2008). The initial supply  O S under autarky is 
represented by the dashed line in Figure 4. Consumer demand D is assumed unaffected by 
the trade regime.  
With the import of foreign products, the externality is transmitted to the domestic 
market and negatively impacts domestic supply with a shift from  O S  to  O S . This change 
in domestic supply after opening to trade in the face of a potential production loss through 
the introduction of some disease can be represented rather straightforwardly. Call   the 
probability  of  losing  the  production  following  the  appearance  of  the  externality. 
Assuming  risk-neutral  domestic  producers,  the  maximization  of  individual  profits 
involves choosing output such that 
2 1
2 (1 ) Oj Oj O Oj p q c q      is maximized.  Oj   is 
the expected profit before the realization of the loss, since the output decision is taken 
before the likely realization of the loss. Solving the individual maximization problem and 
summing  over  producers  the  total  domestic  supply  obtained  is: 28 – A COST-BENEFIT FRAMEWORK FOR THE ASSESSMENT OF NON-TARIFF MEASURES IN AGRO-FOOD TRADE 
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1 ( ) (1 ) /
m
O Oj O j S p q m p c 
     . The higher , the greater is the pivotal shift of the 
inverse supply  O S  to the vertical axis in Figure 4.
12  
Under free trade, the expected equilibrium price is 
G p and  the  total  expected 
domestic welfare is given by area 0 Ga  . The welfare comparison between autarky and 
free trade consists in comparing areas 0  and  GA   (recall from above that welfare is 
OAa under autarky). The welfare effect is ambiguous a priori. If  GA   is larger than0  
the domestic welfare increases under free trade compared to the situation with a policy 
that impedes foreign imports. This case corresponds to a situation with a small probability 
  of losing production following trade liberalization. 




















Note  that a  dynamic  approach  can  be introduced  by  taking  into  account time-
varying  probabilities.  Flows  over  several  periods  can  be  taken  into  account  with  a 
discount factor applied to welfare measures presented in Figure 4. Further sophistication 
can be added but ultimately the likelihood of the externality increases with trade. 
                                                       
12.  Note that one extension of the framework could consider a case where the foreign supply  F S  is 
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7.3  Global-commons externality 
In the context of global-commons externalities two cases can be distinguished. As 
will become clear, the market consumption decisions and the public bad are separable in 
both cases.  
In a first and simple case, consumers suffer a welfare loss from the externality, 
independent  of  their  consumption  decision.  For  example,  biodiversity  is  being 
undermined even if they do not contribute to this failure with their consumption. The loss 
from this non-rival externality is separable from the utility derived from consumption and 
does not influence the demand for a good. Although this may seem counter-intuitive, this 
situation is conceptually equivalent to the situation where the “concerned” consumers do 
not  factor  the  additional  negative  characteristic  into  their  demand  (with  I=0  in 
equation 1). The concept is similar to the analysis of consumer–based externalities, with 
one important difference: concerned consumers cannot fully internalize the externality 
through their individual consumption decisions. The externality should be accounted for 
in the welfare calculations, but does not feedback in the demand. 
In Figure 5 free trade leads to an equilibrium price p
E that equalizes demand and 
total (domestic plus foreign) supply. Because their atomistic consumption decision does 
nothing  to  abate  the  global  externality,  it  does  not  impact  the  demand  of  concerned 
consumers  when  the  market  opens  to  foreign  producers  (in  equation  (2)  the  demand 
is 2( ,0) pQ ).  However,  the  externality  should  be  accounted  for  in  the  welfare 
calculations, but exactly how the externality should be measured is not entirely clear. One 
approach is to take the amounts imported and consumed and to multiply this by the unit 
damage that concerned consumers attach to the global commons externality. This would 
yield the value of the externality as  2 2 2 (1 )
EE r Q r Q   , where  2
E Q  is the consumption 
by  the  proportion  (1-β)  of  concerned  consumers  at  the  price 
E p .  This  approach  to 
accounting  for  global  commons  externalities  as  separable  from  consumption  follows 
(Foster and Just, 1989 and Teisl et al., 2001). Adding the usual consumer surplus (area 
p
EEa) and producer surplus (area Ozp
E ) to the externality (area  22 0
E r tQ ) yields overall 
domestic welfare under free trade as the area  22 00 
E E E zP P Ea r tQ . 
Imposing an import ban eliminates foreign supply from the domestic market. The 
welfare  comparison  between  autarky  and  free  trade  consists  in  comparing  areas 
22 0
E r tQ and zEA (the combined consumer and producer surplus under autarky yields total 
welfare as area OAa ). The area zEA represents a welfare gain under free trade, while area 
22 0
E r tQ is the loss value that concerned consumers attach to negative global externality. 
Welfare under a prohibitive import ban is increased if the per-unit damage  2 r  is relatively 
large so as to outweigh the benefits of lower domestic prices under a free trade regime. 
The above analysis has taken as the basis for valuation the imported and consumed 
quantities of the good that is linked to the global commons externality. Alternatively, if 
the externality comes from the production side (as in the case of rainforest destruction) its 
size could also be measured based on the total quantity of foreign production, and not just 
on the amount imported and consumed domestically. This approach would yield a value 
of the externality that depends on total foreign production, and would increase with the 
total amount of production (the more rainforest is destroyed, the higher the value attached 
to  the  remaining  rainforest).  Although  this  alternative  measurement  of  the  externality 30 – A COST-BENEFIT FRAMEWORK FOR THE ASSESSMENT OF NON-TARIFF MEASURES IN AGRO-FOOD TRADE 
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does  not  lend  itself  easily  to  graphic  exposition  in  Figure 5,  its  principle  is  not 
fundamentally  different  from  the  welfare  accounting  based  on  imports.  As  before, 
consumer and producer surpluses will have to be amended by a valuation of the global 
commons  externality  to  obtain  a  measure  of  total  welfare  under  alternative  policy 
settings.  





















A  second  case,  not  fully  developed  here,  includes  global  commons  when 
concerned consumers reduce their consumption to feel better, although their individual 
impact on the non-rival externality is small. In this latter case, the externality feeds back 
into demand decisions of concerned consumers  but the externality can typically not be 
fully internalized. The consumption decrease is too marginal to induce suppliers, whose 
supply  causes  the  adverse  effect  on  global  commons,  to  change  their  behaviour. 
Concerned  consumers  will  decrease  the  consumption  of  goods  linked  to  the  global 
commons problem to feel better. They may switch to a sustainable good with an eco-label 
if such good is available. This latter situation corresponds to the case of the concerned 
consumers being informed (I = 1) in equation (2), even though the consumers do not fully 
internalize  the  externality  as  the  global  commons  tragedy  continues  to  develop.  This 
second case combines elements of the case where concerned consumers adjust their own 
consumption because of the negative externality or they would switch to a “sustainable” 
substitute  fulfilling  the  eco-label  standards.  Nevertheless,  the  externality  is  not  fully 
internalized  because  other  unconcerned  consumers  purchase  the  regular  good  which 
contributes  to  the  global  commons  problem.  The  externality  can  be  reduced  but  not 
eliminated unless all consumers globally consume the eco-labelled good.  A COST-BENEFIT FRAMEWORK FOR THE ASSESSMENT OF NON-TARIFF MEASURES IN AGRO-FOOD TRADE – 31 
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7.4.  Extensions 
A non-prohibitive standard 
In the previous exposition of the cost-benefit framework the standard was taken to 
be  prohibitive,  leading  to  an  effective  import  ban.  A  more  realistic  approach  should 
consider a standard impacting both domestic supply and foreign supply. Such a standard 
will increase production costs and it will reduce the impact of the specific characteristic 
that the concerned consumers want to avoid. To introduce a non-prohibitive standard 
consumers‟ utility and producers profit are re-formulated as follows:  
2 ( , ) /2 (1 ) i i i i i i i i U q w aq bq I r q w         ,  
2 1
2 ( ) ( ) Oj Oj O Oj O Oj O pq c q k q K        , and 
2 1
2 ( ) ( ) Fj Fj F Fj F Fj F pq c q k q K        .  
Firms bear an effort   , scaled such that 01   , that reduces the damage  ii rq 
for consumers. With this specification, the effort increases domestic and foreign firm‟s 
marginal costs  () O k   and  () F k  , along with sunk costs  () O K   and  () F K  . Firms 
now face two interdependent decisions: the level of effort to comply with a standard and 
the level of production. The optimal choice will depend on market structure and on the 
kind of strategic interaction between firms. In equilibrium, the marginal costs of effort are 
passed on to consumers through the price. When firms incur compliance costs that are 
sunk, these costs are not passed on directly to consumers in the price. 
For  the  cost-benefit  assessment  of  a  standard, its  level  may  be  taken  as  given. 
Alternatively, an optimal level of the standard can be determined by letting domestic, or 
international regulators take a welfare measure into account (Fisher and Serra, 2000). For 
example, a domestic regulator may select a standard that maximizes domestic welfare 
(defined  as  the  sum  of  the  domestic  agents‟  surplus).  This  level  may  hurt  foreign 
producers if it imposes prohibitive costs,  () F k   and  () F K  . On the other hand, an 
international regulator would choose a standard that maximizes global welfare. One can 
also consider a combination of several instruments as a standard and a label (see Marette, 
2007 and 2008). 
Industrial organization considerations, firm entry and exit 
Initially it was assumed that sunk costs  O K  and  F K  were equal to zero. This 
assumption implies that firm exit can be ignored. However, if sunk costs are non-zero, 
profits may be become negative, leading to exit by some firms. If sunk cost depends on 
the compliance efforts a standard may lead to exit by some firms. Some foreign firms 
may  exit  the  market  until  the  other  firms  offering  products  break  even.  This  issue  is 
particularly sensitive if the fixed compliance costs are higher for foreign suppliers than 
for domestic firms. Rau and van Tongeren (2007) show the impact of fixed and variable 
compliance costs on market structure, in a context with complying and non-complying 
Polish suppliers to EU safety standards for meat. 
In his path-breaking analysis Sutton (1991) shows that demand shifting activities, 
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foreign firms. A key insight from this work is that concentration increases as market size 
increases, for example through trade liberalization, if the demand shifting attribute is 
produced at an endogenous set-up cost, as outlined above. Although Sutton‟s analysis 
looked  into  R&D  and  marketing,  his  insights  pertain  equally  to  food  safety  or  food 
quality standards. By selecting a relatively high level of quality and safety standard that 
involves a significant set-up cost, potential foreign competitors can be driven out of the 
domestic market. Since incumbents do not pass the sunk cost to consumers they can 
choose  an  aggressive  pricing  strategy,  thus  eliminating  potential  rivals.  As  a  result, 
concentration at the producer level increases and product variety could decrease. This 
latter mechanism is also found in trade models with heterogeneous firms. Chaney (2005) 
and  Rau  and  van  Tongeren  (2008)  show  that  higher  fixed  cost  of  exporting  lead  to 
shrinking extensive trade margin (less varieties) through exit of less productive exporters. 
In contrast, rising variable trade cost lead to a shrinking extensive margin as well as a 
shrinking intensive trade margin (less exports by all incumbent firms).  
Supply chain 
The framework developed here focused on the end-product, ignoring the upstream 
and downstream effects of NTMs. These could be included by modelling the successive 
processing stages. In particular, a market for input factors could also be introduced, which 
would make variable costs  O c  and  F c  endogenous. This would allow the relative impact 
of  a  standard  imposed  on  the  input  versus  a  standard  imposed  on  the  output  to  be 
measured.  
The introduction of vertical relationships between suppliers in the supply chain 
raises the issue of private standards. Reardon et al. (2003), Fulponi (2006), OECD (2006 
a,b) and OECD (2008 a,b), underscore the rising importance of private standards. The 
development of private standards raises important issues regarding the future direction of 
food safety and quality regulation. Private standards represent a shift in responsibility 
from public agencies to private industry. This raises questions over the degree to which 
regulation is driven by private rather than public considerations. The recent growth of 
private regulation also increases the range of standards with which firms must comply. 
This  could  significantly  increase  the  total  regulatory  burden  on  the  food  system  and 
consumers.  
Foreign consumers and foreign governments  
A comprehensive analysis should take foreign consumers and foreign governments 
into  account,  perhaps  imposing  their  own  policies.  Since  regulations  tend  to  differ 
between countries, especially if they are at different levels of development, this raises the 
issue of mutual recognition or harmonization.  
Border inspections and other non-tariff border measures 
Inspections at the border or other non-tariff border measures such as single port of 
entry lead to increased variable trade costs. Conceptually these can easily be incorporated 
by introducing a tariff-equivalent of such measures that increases the foreign supply price 
paid by domestic consumers. Hummels (2001) develops a method to empirically estimate 
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Pre-shipment inspection 
Instead of inspecting goods once they arrive in the port of destination, compliance 
may be checked at the point of departure (perhaps even at the production facilities). For 
the assessment of the effects of those measures, it should be taken into account who bears 
the  pre-shipment  inspection  costs.  If  it  is  the  country  of  destination,  it  should  be 
accounted as a cost in the importing country. However, if costs have to be borne by the 
exporter, it obviously increases the cost of exporting. Inspection costs might also be split 
between the two countries. Regardless of the question who pays the inspections costs, 
their incidence operates like a tax on imports.  
8.  Recent advances in measuring valuation of market failures and global commons 
This section discusses recent advances in empirically measuring the valuation that 
consumers attach to product characteristics. Arguably, this is the most critical part of the 
analysis, as consumer‟s willingness to pay for (or avoid) certain product characteristics 
largely determines the welfare assessment. The crucial challenge is the assessment of 
consumers‟ valuation when a market for the good does not exist. This is typically the case 
when dealing with externalities and information asymmetries, but also when current trade 
policies exclude imports. It is beyond the scope of this report to provide an exhaustive 
overview of valuation methods, and the treatment here focuses on recent developments, 
including experimental economics. An excellent overview of theories and methods is 
provided in OECD (2006c). As this publication does not discuss experimental methods, 
this report elaborates somewhat on this approach which is increasingly being used and is 
of particular relevance to issues treated in this report.  
8.1  Consumer valuation of failures 
Numerous methods exist for eliciting people‟s values for both market and non-
market  goods  (such  as  externalities  or  environmental  goods).  Many  of  them  are 
potentially  tailored  to  the  analysis  of  NTMs,  since  they  capture  heterogeneity  in 
consumers‟ preferences. The quality of a cost-benefit analysis critically depends on these 
measures. Two types of non-market valuation methods can be used, namely the QALYs 
approach, discussed in Section 6 above, and the WTP approach.  
QALYs  methodologies  may  be  incorporated  into  the  cost-benefit  framework 
proposed here, in particular for damage for which consumers are not aware (Figure 3). As 
discussed in Section 6, a drawback of this approach is its inability to reflect responses of 
consumers in demand. In other words, the costs estimated through QALYs methods have 
no equivalent in terms of demand adjustments linked to reactions of consumers, as the 
adjustments presented in the figures above. 
In  contrast,  methods  based  on  estimates  of  WTP  allow  economists  to  assess 
consumers‟ reaction. These methods make it possible to include quality-related aspects 
that cannot be translated into identifiable short-term illness.  
The preventive expenditure method seeks to measure agents‟ willingness to pay by 
observing the efforts made to avoid illness. With this method, a money evaluation of the 
disutility of being ill is added to the estimated cost of illness, together with an estimate of 
the preventive expenditure that an individual is willing to commit according to a given 
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Contingent  valuation  methods  involve  asking  individuals  directly  about  their 
willingness to pay in order to reduce the risk of an illness, or more generally to obtain 
higher quality in a good. Choice experiments indirectly determine WTP by econometric 
estimation  based  on  various  choices  made  by  consumers.  Experimental  economics 
(including lab, field or natural experiments) brings a group of individuals into a situation, 
where their real behaviour is simulated (in the lab) or influenced (in the field) to reveal 
their willingness to pay for particular qualities (see Lusk and Shogren, 2007a, for an 
exhaustive presentation). One advantage of the experimental method is the precise control 
of the information revealed to consumers, including a measure of their initial knowledge 
via ex ante and ex post questionnaires. The numerical example presented below uses 
WTP measures derived from laboratory choice experiments. Note that a price premium 
for differentiated products that are already sold on a given market may be estimated by 
some econometric method based on hedonic prices. This is for instance the case for the 
eco-label valuation (see Nimon and Beghin, 1999, and Teisl et al., 2002). 
Before briefly detailing some of these WTP methods, it is particularly important to 
reflect on the robustness of these methods, in particular respondents‟ incentives to over- 
or  underestimate their  WTP (see  Shogren,  2006). Different  WTP  methods  have  been 
compared  in  order  to  elicit  biases  (see  a  survey  in  Levitt  and  List,  2007).  From  a 
comparison  with  a  field  experiment,  Blumenschein  et  al.  (2008)  showed  that  the 
hypothetical bias linked to contingent valuation can be removed by a certainty statement 
at the end of the questionnaire. List (2007) notes that field experiments, despite their 
limitations, may be useful bridges between lab experiments and real situations. While still 
being relatively nascent, the use of experimental economics methods can be seen as a 
major breakthrough to obtain more robust estimates of consumer WTP. Several papers 
have directly compared the results of lab experiments with other experiments (including 
field experiments in stores) or market data from supermarkets (eliciting a demand via 
econometric  estimations).  Among  them,  Shogren  et  al.  (1999)  showed  that  lab 
evaluations and market behaviour coincide at high price valuations, supposedly selecting 
the truly interested consumers. Lusk and Fox (2003) and Marette  et al. (2008c) have 
shown that field valuations were close to but exceeded laboratory valuations. Chang et al. 
(2008) showed that for ground beef and wheat flour the results from lab experiments, 
where  participants  have  to  make  real  pecuniary  commitments,  outperformed  the 
contingent-valuation  approaches  experiment  in  predicting  retail  sales.  Despite  their 
limitations,  experimental  results  can  be  considered  as  a  good  approximation  of 
consumers‟  or  citizens‟  reactions,  once  some  biases  have  been  overcome.  A  main 
advantage of this method over other approaches is that it allows choice situations to be 
controlled more precisely, and hence allows in principle for transferring the results into 
other contexts. 
Experimental methods have been widely used recently in many areas linked to 
food safety or food preferences for some characteristics such as GMOs, organic products, 
hormone treated beef, the value of biodiversity etc. (See Table 1.1 in Lusk and Shogren 
(2007b) with its 113 recent references). For issues like food safety, experiments reveal 
preferences for food safety (Hayes et al., 1995 for the US; and Rozan et al., 2004 for 
France).  
The  experiments  about  controversial  goods,  such  as  irradiated  food  or  growth 
hormones such as rBST, are particularly tailored to analyze trade bans (as presented in 
Figure 1). They can capture heterogeneous preferences across countries and they provide 
experimental  data  when  a  foreign  product  is  not  available  on  the  domestic  market. 
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2008 for a complete survey), several relate to the different regulatory environments in 
Europe and the US regarding GMOs. Noussair  et al. (2002) show that a majority of 
French consumers is indifferent to GMOs, in comparison with non-GMOs, a view that 
contradicts  the  current  regulatory  practice.  Huffman  et  al.  (2003,  2007)  show  the 
sensitivity of WTP to the source of information (NGOs, Multinationals or public health 
authorities). Lusk et al. (2003) and Lusk et al. (2006b) directly compared WTP between 
the US and some European countries and show a larger level of reluctance to accept 
GMOs among European consumers compared to the US consumers. These results have 
been used to assess welfare effects of identity preservation between GMOs and non-
GMOs (as for instance A. Sobolevsky, G. Moschini and H. Lapan, 2005). 
The ban on hormone-treated beef in Europe inspired a specific experiment. Alfnes 
and Rickertsen (2003) show that most of the participants in Norway preferred domestic to 
imported  beef.  Hormone-treated  beef  received  the  lowest  mean  bid,  but  28%  of  the 
participants  were  indifferent  or  preferred  U.S.  hormone-treated  to  U.S.  hormone-free 
beef. Note that this type of experimental result justifies the simplifying partitioning of 
consumers into only two groups: concerned ones and indifferent ones.  
Lagerkvist, Carlsson and Viske (2006), via a choice experiment, and Napolitano 
et al. (2008), via a lab experiment, measure WTP for animal welfare (including the use of 
hormones). Some experiments study the effect of the COOL (the country-of-origin-labels 
mentioning the geographic origin of products) program in the US (see Lusk et al., 2006a). 
Some studies elicit the WTP for biodiversity (Stoneham et al. 2003), even if the main 
technique used for this topic is contingent valuation. 
By  directly  revealing  willingness  to  pay,  the  experimental  method  makes  it 
possible to obtain a monetary estimate of all the benefits arising from a given policy 
measure impacting trade. Note that almost all papers in lab experiments elicit WTP but do 
not integrate them into welfare analysis. By estimating the value of information, Rousu 
et al.  (2004,  2007)  come  close  to  welfare  measurement  but  without  any  link  to  a 
calibrated model.  
8.2  The valuation of producer-based externalities 
There is a large scientific literature estimating the  impact of various pests and 
pathogens on agriculture (CABI Compendium, numerous articles in Weed Science, The 
Agronomy  Journal,  Weed  Technology,  among  many  other  journals).  The  CABI 
Compendium series draws on available scientific information worldwide and includes a 
wealth of information on yield loss for a multitude of pathogens and pests on various 
crops, forest, livestock, and aquaculture. The Compendium series scan the last 40 years of 
scientific literature.  
The most recent and visible reviews of the costs associated with invasive species 
are  Pimentel  et al.  (2000)  and  Pimentel  et  al.  (2005).  Using  a  large  survey  of  the 
ecological  and  agronomic  literature,  these  two  articles  provide  agricultural  and 
environmental costs for an extensive list of invasive species. The uncertainty surrounding 
the latter estimates is huge but they nevertheless provide point estimates for yield losses 
or other shifts in the production function or in cost induced by these invasive species. The 
work by Pimentel et al. is a useful source to parameterize both losses in production and 
those associated with global common issues, such as loss of biodiversity, extension of 
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Progress has been considerable recently in integrating epidemiological models into 
economic analysis. Pendell et al. (2007) provide such an analysis for the US Midwest to 
analyze a hypothetical outbreak and spread of Foot and Mouth Disease. Several papers 
look at optimum quarantine policies (surveillance, tests, monitoring) in open or regional 
economies integrating sophisticated and realistic modelling of infestation dynamics and 
their spatial dimension (Adamson and Cook, 2007; Bicknell et al., 1999; Cook, 2007; 
Kompas and Che, 2003 and Kompas  et al., 2004). These analyses rely on stochastic 
dynamic  control,  numerical  methods,  and  sometimes  spatial  models,  to  quantify  the 
diffusion and establishment of invasions and compute optimum quarantine intervention 
levels based on cost/benefit criteria. Results from these analyses can provide some range 
of values for simpler models integrating externalities as simpler supply shifts. 
A large economic literature exists on weed infestation and the cost of managing 
them (e.g. Eisworth and van Kooten, 2002; Taylor and Burt, 1984; Jones and Medd, 
2000;  see  also  references  in  Pimentel  et  al.,  2005).  For  example,  Eiswerth  and  van 
Kooten (2002) analyze the supply impact of weed infestation on yield loss and cost of 
production  on  hay  pastures  for  a  non-indigenous  weed,  the  yellow  starthistle,  and 
considering  five  management  alternatives.  This  type  of  analysis  provides  sufficient 
information to assess yield loss if nothing is done and the cost of mitigating the invasion. 
These are the shifters needed to operationalize the cost-benefit framework. There is also 
an  extensive  interdisciplinary  literature  on  yield  losses  induced  by  multiple  invasive 
weeds and other pests, see for example Swinton et al. (1994) among many others.  
Trade as a vector for entry of invasive species has been also studied. Costello et al. 
(2007), and others look at the introduction of various invasive species in US harbours 
over  time  and  the  associated  welfare  cost.  Levine  and  d‟Antonio  (2003)  analyze  the 
statistical relationship between trade and invasive species for a large set of pests.  
In regard to genetically modified products, Wolfenbarger and Phifer (2000), and 
Qaim and Matuschke (2005) review the available scientific evidence on the cost and 
benefits of growing GMO crops instead of conventional ones, including yield effects, 
savings  on  pesticides,  and  larger  ecological  costs  having  to  do  with  non  depletable 
externalities similar to global commons valued by consumers. Piggott and Marra (2007) 
analyze the farm level costs and benefits associated with two types of refuge policy and 
spraying alternatives at the farm-level and for a large seed company, of policy for GMO 
cotton.  Marra  and  Piggott  (2006)  analyze  the  non  pecuniary  benefits  associated  with 
various GMO crops relative to conventional ones.  
8.3  The valuation of global commons 
Trying to put a value on avoiding mismanagement of resources that are seen to 
belong to the global community is perhaps the most controversial of the cases discussed 
in this report. While countries agree in principle on issues such as the importance of 
remedial action to avoid climate change or to prevent loss of biodiversity, they disagree in 
practice  when  it  comes  to  developing  mechanisms  that  enforce  more  ecologically 
sustainable  behaviour.  Differences  in  valuation  of  the  global  commons  and  unequal 
distribution of costs of remedial action are at the root of difficult multilateral negotiations 
on these topics.  
In the context of global commons, economists typically divide the total economic 
value into “use values” (value derived from using a resource) and “non-use values.” The 
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system is valued positively) and “option values” (although the resource is not used now, 
there is value to having this option to use it later).  
Numerous  studies  exist  today  that  provide  some  estimates  on  each  of  those 
components,  see  the  references  in  the  digital  library  of  the  commons  maintained  by 
Indiana  University  (http://dlc.dlib.indiana.edu/).  The  most  far-reaching,  but  not 
uncontroversial, attempt to value global ecosystems services is documented in Costanza 
et al (1997). This study estimates direct and indirect use values of 17 ecosystem services, 
such  as  gas  regulation,  water  supply  and  nutrient  cycling.  The  study  is  based  on 
previously published data, supplemented with some additional calculations.  
If a certain “commodisation” of the global commons externality can be arranged 
by creating a real market, consumer valuation can be directly observed, and it is not 
necessary to resort to the non-market valuation methods discussed previously. The price 
premium  that  consumers  in  importing  countries  are  willing  to  pay  for  sustainably 
produced  products  over  non-sustainable  ones  directly  reveals  information  about  their 
valuation of the global commons in question. 
A  valuation  study  addressing  global  commons  issues  that  is  conceptually  very 
close to the framework proposed in this report is provided by Larson (2003). He shows 
how  labelling  of  shade-grown  coffee  could  contribute  to  internalizing  positive 
environmental externalities into consumer demand. Positive effects on tree flora and bird 
fauna are attributed to coffee grown under shaded, small scale and lower yield conditions.  
Large  scale  and  government-backed  attempts  exist  in  sustainability  labelling 
schemes for tropical timbers and in marine fisheries. The International Tropical Timber 
Organisation finds in a recent study (ITTO, 2008) that buyers in importing countries have 
generally not been willing to pay a large premium for certified products. Observed price 
premiums can be as low as 2% for UK imports of MTCC-certified meranti sawnwood 
from Asia, to reach 10-30% for certified tropical timber used in marine construction in 
Denmark. However, no price premiums have been reported in the Japanese market. Such 
variation  in  price  premiums  can  partly  be  explained  by  differences  across  importing 
countries  in  consumer  valuation  of  tropical  forest.  Price  premiums  differences  across 
exporting countries can partly be explained by uncertainty about the truthfulness of the 
label which leads to varying price premiums, especially for imports from Africa.  
If a price premium is possible, the risk of free-riding also emerges. Producers have 
an incentive to save on the additional cost of more sustainable resource use, including the 
cost of certification and identity preservation, while still labelling their product as being 
of the sustainable variety. If the monitoring of the labelling is imperfect, and consumers 
learn  about  this  loophole,  the  value  of  information  carried  by  the  label  and  the 
certification scheme will be undermined. This can prompt importing countries to resort to 
alternative NTMs. Norway, for example, has decided in 2007 to ban all tropical timber 
from publicly procured construction, regardless of the label. 
9.  Towards implementation of the framework 
This  section  explains  how  the  framework  proposed  in  section  6  can  be  made 
operational for actual policy analysis. The section goes through the usual steps involved 
in implementation of a model, from specifying functional forms to finding estimates of 
important parameters of the specified model, and various data types required to calibrate 
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9.1  Parameterization 
Even if a product with a specific characteristic is not available on the domestic 
market, and hence demand cannot be observed, supply and demand functions can be 
calibrated.  The  WTP  for  the  specific  characteristic  can  be  obtained  from  contingent 
valuation studies or experimental results, as discussed above. Under autarky or under a 
prohibitive  policy  precluding  imports  of  foreign  products,  parameters  of  the  linear 
demand and supply functions can be calibrated to domestic market prices and quantities.  
Without the introduction of the foreign product, the demand and supply equations 
on the domestic market are represented by linear approximations with the corresponding 
elasticity at the point of approximation. From equation (2), the overall demand without 
information (with I = 0) is defined by ( ) ( )/ Q p a p b  . With the observed quantity  ˆ Q  
sold over a period, the average price  ˆ p  observed over the period, and the direct price 
elasticity     ( ( / )( / ) dQ dP P Q  ) obtained from econometric estimates, the calibration 
leads  to  estimated  values  for  the  demand  equal  to   ˆ ˆ 1/ / b Q p    ,   ˆ ˆ a bQ p   . 
Section 8.2 below mentions several elasticity databases that are publicly available to draw 
from. 
WTP  estimates  coming  from  experiments  or  contingent  valuation  have  to  be 
integrated in the calibrated demand. A pre-condition is of course that the sample used in 
the experiments is representative of the general population analyzed in the investigation.
13 
From experimental results, the proportions of indifferent and concerned participants can 
be identified. 
Results from choice experiments can subsequently be integrated into the calibrated 
demand function for the proportion of consumers interested in or reluctant to consume a 
specific characteristic in a way consistent with the framework defined by equation (1) and 
(2) in subsection 6.1.
14 The revelation of information in the lab allows participants to 
know the characteristic provided by the foreign product introduced under free trade (with 
or  without  a  mandatory  label).  This  procedure  allows  the  WTP  for  the  specific 
characteristic to be isolated econometrically. Of course, the changes in WTP from the 
experiment can only be used reliably in the calibrated model if the impact of information 
is statistically significant.  
Under free trade, the undesirable characteristic of the foreign good is unpalatable 
for concerned consumers. It causes a parallel inward shift of the demand curve at the 
initial equilibrium price which is in keeping with the model of Polinsky and Rogerson 
(1983) and Lichtenberg  et al. (1998). The relative variations of WTP observed in the 
experiment focusing on the additional characteristic serve to determine the demand shift 
(see Marette et al., 2008a for details).  
The  demand  variation  based  on  the  lab  experiment  is  measured  in  a  vertical 
demand  “decreasing”  shift  and  leads  to  
2 D   in  Figure  2  with 
[ ( ) ( )]/ ( )
hh h h E WTP E WTP E WTP   , where E(.) denotes the expected value of the 
WTP  for  subjects  of  the  experiment  who  significantly  change  their  WTP  after  the 
                                                       
13.   This eliminates experimental studies made with students on campus. 
14.   Note that this group could also be divided into several subgroups according to the importance of 
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revelation of the information about the characteristic of the imported product (namely 
hh h WTP WTP  ), and where h denotes the situation before the information was revealed 
and hh denotes the situation after.
 The relative change   isolates the relative WTP for the 
additional characteristic independently from the initial endowment or the initial value of 
the product offered during the experiment. With the model calibrated for an initial price 
A p  and integrated in the cost benefit analysis the value of the shift is  2
A rp   . This is 
to  be  incorporated  into  equation  (2),  with  a  decreasing  demand  shift  for  0     and 
positive demand shift for  0   . This value measures the shift of the demand calibrated 
at  a  price
A p .  Note  that  the  welfare  computed  with  unaware  consumers  can  also  be 
estimated with this measure (see Marette et al. (2008b) for details). 
9.2.  Data sources 
WTP measures 
As explained in section 7, WTP measures linked to contingent valuation or lab 
experiments can be directly estimated or alternatively they can be found via meta-analysis 
of published results. Remaining parameters can often be obtained from outside sources. 
When using secondary data, it is important to make allowance for the specific situational 
context and country context in which these estimates are made. WTP estimates obtained 
in one specific country and in one specific context may not be directly transferable to 
other situations, and adjustments may be necessary to take such differences into account. 
Elasticities 
Demand and supply price and income elasticities are available from two databases 
extensively  used  for  partial  equilibrium  modelling:  FAPRI 
(http://www.fapri.iastate.edu/tools/elasticity.aspx)  and  USDA-ERS 
(http://www.ers.usda.gov/Data/InternationalFoodDemand/.  The  database  underlying  the 
OECD/FAO  Agkink-Cosimo  model  also  provides  a  multitude  of  elasticity  estimates 
OECD  (2007b)  and  http://www.agri-
outlook.org/pages/0,2987,en_36774715_36775671_1_1_1_1_1,00.html. Recent estimates 
of  import  demand  elasticities  are  provided  by  Kee  et  al.  (2008)  who  estimate  such 
elasticities for goods disaggregated at the HS-6-digit level for a large set of countries. 
Data on policies and trade frictions  
Two  databases  have  hitherto  been  central  to  the  analysis  of  TBTs  and  SPS 
regulations. First, WTO notifications of some NTM measures are collected and processed 
by  the  United  Nations  Conference  on  Trade  and  Development  (UNCTAD)  in  the 
TRAINS database. UNCTAD complements the notifications using national sources and 
categorizes the various measures into a policy classification of its own as follows: para-
tariff measures, price control measures, finance measures, automatic licensing measures, 
quantity  control  measures,  monopolistic  measures,  and  technical  measures.  These 
categories  are  further  disaggregated  into  finer  policy  types  (see 
http://r0.unctad.org/trains_new/tcm_link.shtm). TRAINS is available at a cost through the 
WITS system maintained by the World Bank (http://wits.worldbank.org/witsweb/). WITS 
makes  these  data  available  at  the  HS-6  commodity  level  and  allows  several  official 40 – A COST-BENEFIT FRAMEWORK FOR THE ASSESSMENT OF NON-TARIFF MEASURES IN AGRO-FOOD TRADE 
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motives of the policies (health protection, environmental protection, etc) to be identified. 
This database was recently used by Disdier et al. (2008); Fontagné et al. (2005); and 
Henry de Frahan and Vancauteren (2006), among others. A drawback of these datasets 
arises from uneven reporting by countries and heterogeneous coverage of measures across 
countries and commodities. It may say more about reporting behaviour than regulations. 
For a discussion of this database see OECD (2008c).  
The second important database recently used is Perinorm (www.perinorm.com), a 
bibliographic database sponsored by the British, German, and French industrial norm 
agencies (BSI, DIN and AFNOR). It provides information on public standards, which are 
voluntary, and technical regulations, which are mandatory. Hence, both mandatory and 
voluntary  standards  are  covered.  The  database  includes  national,  European  and 
international standards from 23 countries, and provides a total of more than 1,100,000 
records on standards from Australia, EU countries, Japan, and the USA. This database 
was used by Moenius (1999) and (2006) and by Czubala, et al. (2007). These authors 
ingeniously use the data to identify bilaterally shared standards from non-shared ones 
(Moenius) and international standards from non-harmonized ones (Czubala et al., 2007). 
Czubala et al. rely on Perinorm in combination with the online catalogue of the European 
Committee for Standardization to create an original database of EU product standards 
applied to textiles and clothing. These data distinguish between “harmonized” standards 
that are equivalent to ISO standards and those that are not. The inclusion of voluntary 
standards in Perinorm is an advantage compared to the notifications data developed by 
UNCTAD representing mandatory TBTs, but the country coverage is much more limited.  
The  newly  created  WTO  SPS  Information  Management  System  (SPSIMS) 
(http://spsims.wto.org/) provides new and easier access to SPS notifications to the WTO 
as well as to official trade concerns communicated by Members to the SPS Committee of 
the WTO. SPSIMS essentially provides online access to textual information. The public 
version of the system provides SPS information, concerns, and notifications according to 
their  specific  needs  using  searches  based  on  various  criteria  (geographic  groupings, 
product codes, comment periods, and keywords). The SPS section of the WTO website is 
a  major  source  of  information  on  mandatory  standards  and  disputes.  These  SPS 
notification  data  are  also  available  through  the  Inquit  database  (www.inquit.com).  It 
offers convenient access to SPS measures from September 1999 to May 2007. WTO 
dispute  data  has  been  compiled  and  analyzed  by  and  are  available  from  Horn  and 
Mavroidis (2006). 
Information  on  international  legal  instruments  relating  to  food  safety  is  made 
publicly available through the International Portal on food safety, animal and plant health 
(IPFSAPH) http://www.ipfsaph.org/). IPFSAPH is a joint undertaking between a number 
of  SPS-recognized  standard-setting  organizations  and  international  agencies.  It  was 
developed by FAO in association with Codex Alimentarius, the IPPC Secretariat and 
OIE. The database contains binding international legal instruments relating to food safety: 
international  instruments  (those  developed  by  standard  setting  bodies,  such  as  OIE, 
Codex Alimentarius), regional instruments (mainly European Union regulations), soft law 
instruments (such as OECD safety considerations for biotechnology 1992, and the FAO 
Code  of  conduct  for  responsible  fisheries).  The  portal  provides  search  facilities  by 
commodity, by country and by cross-sectoral issues (such as human health impact).  
The World Bank has also a database developed by Wilson and associates on trade 
facilitation using survey information from the World Economic Forum. In addition, the 
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(http://www1.worldbank.org/wbiep/st-db/) is the first attempt to globally investigate the 
impacts  of  technical  requirements  with  surveys.  They  collect  information  from 
agricultural,  manufacturing,  and  trade  firms  in  various  emerging  market  countries 
regarding technical barriers encountered in export markets, which impact their ability to 
successfully  export.  The  data  collected  cover  689  firms  in  over  20  industries  in 
17 developing countries. 
10.  An illustration: labelling of fish 
The following example illustrates the application of the cost-benefit framework for 
NTMs. It assesses the impact of mandatory labelling in the case of fish consumption in 
France and is based on Marette et al. (2008a). The illustration evaluates the impact of a 
label providing health information affecting consumer choice between a relatively “risky” 
type of fish (i.e. tuna) and a type of fish that is not only “less risky” but in addition offers 
health benefits (i.e. sardine). From a health policy perspective, a shift of consumption 
towards sardines is desirable because the latter contains more of the healthy omega-3 
fatty acids and less of the unhealthy methylmercury than tuna does. However, policies 
that induce substitution away from tuna have international trade implications, as most 
canned  tuna  (95%)  and  canned  sardines  (99%)  consumed  in  France  is  imported.  In 
particular, foreign producers of tuna would face a declining demand after the revelation 
of information about risk (as in Figure 3). This could have significant impact on tuna-
exporting countries in the developing world, such as Ivory Coast, and the Seychelles 
(Ofimer, 2007). This example corresponds to a welfare evaluation that is very close to the 
case comparing Figure 2 and Figure 3 above. The possibility of a prohibitive standard, 
amounting to a ban on tuna imports, is not considered here, but would be conceptually 
close to the comparison of Figure 1 and Figure 2 above. The price impact of a prohibitive 
ban would likely be substantial.  
To obtain consumer‟s valuation of the health attributes and to obtain an assessment 
of the  value  of  product  information  linked to  a  mandatory  label,  a laboratory  choice 
experiment  was  conducted.  Subjects  invited  to  participate  were  French  women  of 
childbearing age, since fish is particularly important during pregnancy.  Following the 
methodology described in subsection 9.1, the results of the experiment are calibrated with 
market data and elasticity estimates to determine the value of the information. Compared 
to the framework outlined in this report, an additional factor is the presence of two goods 
(tuna and sardines) that are substitutes in consumption.  
Parameters of the model are initially calibrated such as to replicate prices and 
quantities in France for the year 2002 (Table 2), the most recent complete year when the 
analysis was undertaken. For the supply side, a linear supply function is calibrated to 
elasticity  estimates  that  are  found  in  the  literature.  The  calibration  of  linear  demand 
function parameters uses own-price and cross-price elasticity estimates for both tuna and 
sardines.  Three  different  demands  are  calibrated  for  the  initial  situation  without 
information on product attributes: 1) A group of consumers who purchase both tuna and 
sardines;  2) a  group  of  consumers  who  only  purchase  tuna;  and  3) consumers  only 
purchasing  sardines. The aggregation  of  demands  of  different  subgroups  leads  to  the 
overall demand.  
The  initial  demand  allows  welfare  to  be  computed  in  the  absence  of  health 
information. The welfare impact of information is obtained using the results from the lab 
experiment to update demand after the health information has been revealed. 42 – A COST-BENEFIT FRAMEWORK FOR THE ASSESSMENT OF NON-TARIFF MEASURES IN AGRO-FOOD TRADE 
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It is assumed that only the demands of consumers consuming both types of fish are 
modified by health information provided to them.
15 From the choice behaviours in the 
experimental setting the response to product information can be observed.  From the 
experiment and from the definition of   in subsection 9.1, the average increase in the 
relative sardine WTP is  0.79 sardine    after the revelation of information, which leads to 
an increasing demand shift (see Marette et al., 2008a). The average change in the relative 
tuna  WTP  is  0.21 tuna     after  the  revelation  of  information,  which  leads  to  a 
decreasing demand shift. These values from the experiment sample are extrapolated to the 
corresponding French population to calibrate the shifts in demands for tuna and sardines. 
In order to single out the subgroup of the consumers being “at risk”, or “concerned”, from 
those that are “indifferent” (not concerned by the health message of this experiment), the 
analysis  assumes  that  only  households  with  women  of  childbearing  age  and/or  with 
young children under age 14 are relevant (recall that only women of childbearing age 
participated in the experiment since this group is targeted by food safety authorities). This 
distinction is made on the basis of medical evidence that clearly identifies this group as 
being  at  greater  risk.  The  group  of  households  “at  risk”  represents  50.5%  of  French 
consumers.  The  rest  of  the  population  is  considered  as  completely  indifferent  with 
0 sardine    and  0 tuna   , which is a restrictive assumption. 
Table 2. Demand Specification for canned tuna and canned sardines in France 
Variable  Description  Values   
Canned Tuna  Overall consumption in France in 2002 (in tons)  63 845   
  Average price in 2002 (in euros)  6.1   
  Supply elasticity
  0.2   
Canned Sardines  Overall consumption in France in 2002 (in tons)  11 484   
  Average price in 2002 (in euros)  8.2   
  Supply elasticity  0.2   
Consumers   1) purchasing both sardines and tuna     
  % of households consuming sardines and tuna
3  65%   
  Demand elasticities  Tuna  Sardines 
  Own-price  –0.58*  –0.476* 
  Cross-price  –0.059*  0.144* 
Consumers   2) only purchasing tuna      
  % of households consuming only tuna  32.5%   
  Own-price elasticity of demand  –0.534*   
Consumers   3) only purchasing sardines     
  % of households consuming only sardines  2.5%   
  Own-price elasticity of demand  –0.451*   
Source: Marette et al. (2008a).
 For the estimation for the elasticity, * indicates significance at the 5% level in the 
regression between the log of quantities and the log of prices. 
                                                       
15.  An extension could allow for the additional possibility that consumers who only purchase tuna 
and consumers  who  only  purchase  sardines  change  their  consumption  but  the  experimental 
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To measure different forms of information diffusion, a case where all the 50.5% of 
concerned households receive health information is distinguished from a case where only 
half of these concerned consumers are reached by this information. The change in profits 
for foreign producers of canned tuna and canned sardines can be singled out from the 
supply chain profits (canning industry and domestic retailers). The estimation of foreign 
producers‟  profits  takes  into  account  the  share  of  imports  relative  to  domestic 
consumption of canned fish (95% for canned tuna and 99% for canned sardines) and it 
takes into account the share of the canning industry in the total value added of the supply 
chain. Based on import prices and retail prices, the estimated share of the consumer price 
received  by  the  tuna  canning  industry  is  48%  and  the  share  of  the  consumer  price 
received by the sardines canning industry is 37%. The rest of the total value added goes to 
the French retailers. We now turn to the results. 
Table 3. Economic effects of labels (information) to prices and different groups  
(in euros) 














Price variations         
T p    Tuna absolute  Euros  –0.28  –0.14 
ˆ / Tt pp    Tuna relative  %   –4.6%  –2.3% 
s p    Sardine absolute  Euros  3.70  1.85 
ˆ / ss pp    Sardine relative  %  45.2%  22.6% 
Surplus variation when prices vary        
T     Change of profits for the total 
canned tuna supply chain  
Euros  –21 579 855  –10 832 098 
F
T    Change of profits of foreign 
producers 
Euros    –9 977 086   –5 008 039 
S    Change of profits for the total 
canned sardine-supply chain 
Euros   54 931 214   26 503 449 
F
S    Change of profits for foreign 
producers 
Euros   20 444 841   9 864 315 
FF
ST      Change of total foreign 
producers profits 
   10 467 755   4 856 276 
1 CS    Change of surplus non-
concerned consumers 
Euros  –13 830 515  –12 576 828 
2 CS    Change of surplus concerned 
consumers 
Euros   7 609 339   8 403 685 
O W    Domestic welfare     16 662 428   6 641 931 
W    Total welfare (domestic 
welfare+ foreign profits) 
Euros   27 130 183   11 498 207 
/ WW   (%)  Relative total welfare change  %  2.8%  1.2% 
Source: Marette et al. (2008a) and authors‟ estimation for profits of foreign suppliers. 44 – A COST-BENEFIT FRAMEWORK FOR THE ASSESSMENT OF NON-TARIFF MEASURES IN AGRO-FOOD TRADE 
 
 
OECD FOOD, AGRICULTURE AND FISHERIES WORKING PAPERS N°21@ OECD 2009 
Table 3 provides the economic impact of information on prices and surpluses of 
agents for the year 2002. The demand shifts imply a fall in the equilibrium price for tuna 
( 0 T p  )  and  an  increase  in  the  equilibrium  price  for  sardine  ( 0 S p  ).The  price 
change for sardines is larger than the absolute value of the price change for tuna, because 
the demand-increasing shift for sardines is larger than the demand decreasing shift for 
tuna. Consequently, profits for tuna producers fall, while profits for sardine producers 
surge. Foreign tuna producers suffer from the revelation of information, but this loss is 
outweighed by the benefit to foreign sardine producers, since the change in total foreign 
profits is positive. Retailers who capture more than half of the value added in the supply 
chain (52% of the consumer price for tuna and 63% of the consumer price for sardines) 
benefit from the revelation of information. Consumers in households at risk benefit from 
the information, as shown by the positive change of their consumer surplus. This group 
benefits from having the possibility to make better informed consumption decisions. The 
change  in  surplus  of  these  concerned  consumers  is  a  little  higher  when half  of  the 
concerned consumers receive information compared to the full revelation to all concerned 
consumers (EUR 8.4 million compared to EUR 7.6 million ). Indeed, the benefit linked to 
additional  information  mainly  comes  from  information  about  the  omega 3  content  of 
sardines. However, the large upward price effect for sardines partially cancels out these 
benefits  linked  to  the  revelation  of  information.  Consumers  not  concerned  by  the 
information suffer from the subsequent change in market prices with a negative change in 
their consumer surplus. This loss comes from the large price increase for sardines that 
outweighs the positive impact of the small price decrease for tuna. As non-concerned 
consumers mainly consume tuna, the change in surplus of these non concerned consumers 
is of similar magnitude under both scenarios since the price variation of tuna is relatively 
low with a relatively inelastic demand. Table 3 shows a positive net welfare gain from 
informing households at risk despite some losses for tuna producers and for consumers 
not concerned by the revealed information.  
Note that this analysis could be extended by considering other NTM instruments, 
such as a mercury standard imposed on tuna, and tax and subsidy instruments (Marette 
et al., 2008b). As underlined above, the results of this type of analysis depend on the 
configuration of parameters and on the quality of data used. To determine the robustness 
of the results and to underline its limits a thorough sensitivity analysis with alternative 
assumptions,  ranges  of  parameter  values  and  different  scenarios  can  be  employed. 
Showing whether a conclusion is robust under a range of plausible parameters can be 
more valuable than one single positive welfare estimate. This simple example illustrates 
the applicability, feasibility, and flexibility of the proposed framework.  
11.  Concluding remarks 
This report opens the way toward a systematic analysis of economic costs and 
benefits of NTMs. The proposed methodology is operational for comparing alternative 
policy choices like standards, border inspections policy and labelling in an international 
context.  The  methodology  contributes  to  a  more  comprehensive  welfare  analysis  of 
NTMs than that offered by looking at trade affects alone. 
Efficiency costs of NTMs are much less evident than the welfare losses associated 
with tariffs and quota. NTMs do not necessarily embody the economic inefficiencies that 
are associated with classical trade barriers, unless they discriminate between sources of 
supply, and they may be the least trade-restricting policies available in the face of market A COST-BENEFIT FRAMEWORK FOR THE ASSESSMENT OF NON-TARIFF MEASURES IN AGRO-FOOD TRADE – 45 
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imperfections. It is therefore not clear a priori that the trade impacts of regulations are 
inefficient,  or  that  removal  of  associated  non-tariff  measures  that  affect  trade  would 
achieve efficiency gains that would exceed the losses from weaker regulation.  
The  proposed  comparative  approach  to  NTMs  allows  for  the  identification  of 
alternative ways to address a given regulatory problem. By systematically enumerating 
costs  and  benefits  for  all  the  different  economic  actors  involved,  an  evidence-based 
approach can be followed that yields a solid basis for mutual exchange and identification 
of least-cost solutions. This approach gains particular importance in view of the rising 
occurrence of trade frictions about food safety and food quality (Josling et al. 2004).  
The proposed methodology also opens possibilities for analytical work based on 
the newly proposed NTM classification by the MAST group.  
By applying the proposed framework to several cases with different policy settings 
and in different markets will gain insights into its applicability and limitations under a 
variety of circumstances, and whether the model is able to provide reliable estimates of 
all  benefits  and  costs.  Two  papers  (TAD/TC/CA/WP(2008)4)  and 
TAD/TC/CA/WP/RD(2008)1 prepared for the Joint Working Party on Agriculture and 
Trade discuss the data availability and selection of possible cases for further analysis.  46 – A COST-BENEFIT FRAMEWORK FOR THE ASSESSMENT OF NON-TARIFF MEASURES IN AGRO-FOOD TRADE 
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Appendix 1:  
 
The MAST Classification of NTMs 
Classification of Non-Tariff Measures (version June 2008) 
A000 SANITARY AND PHYTOSANITARY 
MEASURES 
Sanitary and phytosanitary measures include laws, decrees, 
regulations, requirement, standards and procedures to 
protect human, animal or plant life or health. 
A100 Voluntary standards  Rules, guidelines or characteristics for products or 
processes and production methods, which are designed to 
protect human, animal and plant health and life.(e.g. 
composition, quality and hygiene), approved by recognized 
bodies at international, national or sub-national levels, or 
those set established by private companies. Voluntary 
standards do not have the authority of law. 
A110 International Standards  Standards developed by international standards 
organisations. By definition, international standards are 
suitable for universal, worldwide use. 
A111 Production Process standards  Standards defining processes for the production chain that 
will contribute to the safety and suitability of products. 
A112 Product characteristics standards  Standards defining the characteristics requested for 
products (e.g. size, colour, composition and quality) and 
contribute to the safety and suitability of products. 
A119 International Standards, n.e.s.   
A120 National Standards  In general, each country or economy has a single 
recognized Standards Body (NSB). SPS allows countries to 
set their own standards which must be based on science. 
Applications of these rules must be limited to the extent 
necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health. 
These rules should not be used arbitrarily or unjustifiably to 
discriminate between countries where identical or similar 
conditions prevail. 
A121 Production process standards  Standards defining processes for the production chain that 
will contribute to the safety and suitability of products 
A122 Product characteristics standards  These will rule the characteristics requested for products 
(e.g. size, colour, composition and quality) and will 
contribute to the safety and suitability of products. 
A129 National Standards, n.e.s. 
 
 
A130 Subnational Standards  Standards that may be imposed by a state or region within a 
country imposing extra requirements beyond national 
standards. 
A131 Production process standards  Standards defining processes for the production chain that 
will contribute to the safety and suitability of products. 
A132 Product characteristics standards  Standards defining the characteristics requested for 
products (e.g. size, colour, composition and quality) and 
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A139 Subnational Standards, n.e.s. 
 
 
A140 Private Standards*  Standards demanded by private entities, such as 
organizations representing supermarket chains and other 
bodies. (e.g. pesticide regulations, traceability and general 
hygiene of foodstuffs). 
A200 Sanitary and phytosanitary regulations  Sanitary and phytosanitary regulations include laws, 
decrees, requirements and procedures to protect human, 
animal or plant life or health. Compliance is mandatory. 
A210 Labelling, Marking and Packaging 
requirements 
 
Measures regulating the kind, colour and size of printing on 
consumer packages and labels and defining the information 
that may or should be provided to the consumer which is 
directly related to food safety.  
A211 Labelling requirements  Labelling is any written, electronic, or graphic 
communication on the consumer packaging or on a separate 
but associated label. 
A212 Marking requirements  Measures defining the information for transport and 
customs, that the transport/distribution packaging of goods 
should carry, which are directly related to food safety. 
A213 Packaging requirements  Measures regulating the mode in which goods must be or 
cannot be packed, in conformity with the importing country 
handling equipment or for other reasons, and defining the 
packaging materials to be used, which is directly related to 
food safety. 
A220 Traceability requirements  Traceability is the disclosure of information regarding the 
origin of live animals and animal products as well as for 
agricultural products, including product processing history, 
and the distribution and location of the product after 
delivery. It aims to track through all phases of production 
and distribution. 
A221 Origin of materials and parts  Description of geographical origin of animals, plants and 
their derivative products. 
A222 Processing history  Description of all stages of production 
A223 Distribution and location of products after 
delivery 
Description of transport, handling and storage of products 
after the production is finished 
A229 Traceability requirements, n.e.s. 
 
 
A230 Tolerance limits for residues and 
contaminants, or restricted use of certain 
substances 
Maximum concentration of residue levels permitted (MRLs) 
on food, feed, wood, plants etc., or restriction on the use of 
certain substances as ingredients 
A231 Tolerance limits for residues of or 
contamination by certain substances in foods and 
feeds 
Maximum Residue Limits (MRL) for toxic and other harmful 
substances and contaminants that enter the product during 
the production and/or distribution processes (e.g. 
insecticides, heavy metals, POPs and chemicals generated 
during processing such asacryl amide). 
A232 Restricted use of certain substances in 
foods and feeds 
Restriction on the use of certain substances as ingredients, 
which are therefore reasonably expected to exist in the final 
product. As a result, their specification is also important to 
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A240 Regulation of foods or feeds derived from, 
or produced using genetically modified 
organisms (GMO) 
These regulations may include labelling and authorization 
requirement or outright prohibition. 
A250 Hygienic requirement  Restrictions to avoid contamination by microorganisms and 
parasites in foods and feeds that cover production, 
manufacturing, transport and storage conditions. Includes 
post-harvest treatment and pathogen controls 
A260 Disease prevention measuresA261 
Restriction/prohibition in case of outbreak of 
infectious diseases 
 
  Measures to protect animals, humans and plants from any 
infectious/contagious diseases. Covers restrictions other 
than quarantine requirements. Measures included in this 
category are typically more of an ad-hoc and time-bound 
nature 
A262 Quarantine requirement  Requirement to quarantine imports for a certain period. It is 
not a prohibitive measure. Quarantine supposes also 
quarantine fees, inspection fees, veterinary fees, boarding, 
fumigation etc. 
A270 Regulations on productions processes:  This group of entries registers safety regulations relating to 
the production process (such as for example HACCP). It 
covers primary production (plant & animals) and 
processing. National regulations that provide that only 
foods produced under certain code of practices can be 
accepted for sale are also included. 
A271 Plant growth processes 
A272 Animal raising or catching processes 
A273 Food and feed processing, including 
storage and transport 




A280 Geographical restrictions  Prohibition on imports of specified products from countries 
or regions due to presence of phytosanitary hazards (e.g. 
insects, mites, plant pathogens) 




A300 Conformity assessment related to SPS  Control, inspection and approval procedure, including 
procedures for sampling, testing and inspection, evaluation, 
verification and assurance of conformity; and accreditation 
and approval 
A310 Certification requirement  Certification requirements either in the exporting or 
importing country 
A311 Certification by government agencies of 
the countries of origin 
Requirement to obtain certifications from the exporting 
country. 
A312 Certification by local agencies in the 
destination market 
Requirement to obtain certifications from the importing 
country. 
A320 Lack of recognition  Certifications issued by a country or authority are not 
recognized by the importing country. 
A321 Lack of acceptance of internationally 
recognized accredited conformity assessment 
bodies 
International certifications are not recognized by the 
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A322 Lack of acceptance of certificates of 
conformity assessment bodies issued in the 
country of origin 
Certifications from exporters are not recognized by the 
importing country. 
A323 Lack of acceptance of Self Declaration of 
Conformity (SDoC) 
SDoC: procedure by which a supplier provides a written 
assurance that a product conforms to specified requirements 
A329 Lack of recognition, n.e.s. 
 
 
A330 Testing requirement  Includes sampling requirement and are usually associated 
to testing or laboratory fees 
A340 Inspection and clearance requirement  Imports require inspection and/or clearance to be accepted. 
Inspection can be done by public or private entities. 
A350 Registration requirement  Importers may need to be registered in the importing 
country. It is often the case for sensitive products such as 
medicines and/drugs. Exporters need to contact a registered 
importer. 
A360 Repetition in destination market of 
identical tests for same or equivalent regulations 
For a given regulation, a same test must be performed 
within a destination country at national, regional and/or 
local entry points 
A370 Translation requirement for reports or 
certificates 
Documents must be translated to the language of the 
destination countries 
A380 Requirement to pass through specified 
entry point or customs 
Certain goods must be cleared at a specific entry point 
within a destination country for availability of testing or 
inspection facility 
A390 Conformity assessment related to SPS 
n.e.s. 
A900 Sanitary and phytosanitary measures, n.e.s 
 
B000 TECHNICAL BARRIERS TO TRADE  Technical barriers to trade (TBT) are regulations/standards 
referring to technical specification of products and 
conformity assessment systems thereof 
B100 Voluntary standards  Rules, guidelines or characteristics for products or 
processes and production methods (e.g. size, colour, 
composition, quality, security and safety), approved by a 
recognized bodies at international, national or sub-national 
levels, or those established by private companies. 
Compliance is not mandatory as voluntary standards do not 
have the authority of law. 
B110 International Standards  Are standards developed by international standards 
organisations? By definition, international standards are 
suitable for universal, worldwide use. 
B111 Production Process standards  Standards defining processes for the production chain that 
will contribute to the security, safety and suitability of 
products. 
B112 Product characteristics standards  Standards defining the characteristics requested for 
products (e.g. size, colour, components and quality) and 
contribute to the security, safety and suitability of products. 
Also includes those related to product performance. 
B113 Management system standards  Standards that provide requirements or give guidance on 
good management practice, establishing a framework on 
production (e.g. the quality system of a manufacturing 
business might include looking at more efficient 
manufacturing processes or speeding up distribution). 
B119 International Standards, n.e.s. 
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B120 National Standards  Technical standards to be applied at National Level 
regulating product technical characteristics and production 
processes 
B121 Production process standards  Standards defining processes for the production chain that 
will contribute to the security, safety and suitability of 
products. 
B122 Product characteristics standards  Standards defining the characteristics requested for 
products (e.g. size, colour, components and quality) and 
contribute to the security, safety and suitability of products. 
Also includes those related to product performance. 
B129 National Standards, n.e.s. 
 
 
B130 Subnational Standards  Standards that may be imposed by a state or region within a 
country imposing extra requirements beyond national 
standards. 
B131 Production process standards  Standards defining processes for the production chain that 
will contribute to the security, safety and suitability of 
products. 
B132 Product characteristics standards  Standards defining the characteristics requested for 
products (e.g. size, colour, components and quality) and 
contribute to the security, safety and suitability of products. 
Also includes those related to product performance. 
B139 Subnational Standards, n.e.s. 
B140 Private Standards* 
Standards demanded by non-governmental bodies, such as 
private companies. (e.g. computer software standards or 
electric appliances). 
B200 Technical regulations   
B210 Labelling, Marking and Packaging 
requirements 
B211 Labelling requirements 
 
Measures regulating the kind, colour and size of printing on 
packages and labels and defining the information that may 
or should be provided to the consumer. Labelling is any 
written, electronic, or graphic communication on the 
packaging or on a separate but associated label, or on the 
product itself. 
B212 Marking requirements  Measures defining the information for transport and 
customs, that the transport/distribution packaging of goods 
should carry. 
B213 Packaging requirements  Measures regulating the mode in which goods must be or 
cannot be packed, in conformity with the importing country 
handling equipment or for other reasons, and defining the 
packaging materials to be used. 
B220 Traceability requirements  Traceability is the disclosure of information regarding the 
origin of materials and parts, including product processing 
history, and the distribution and location of the product 
after delivery. It aims to track through all phases of 
production and distribution. 
B221 Origin of materials and parts  Description of geographical origin of materials and parts. 
B222 Processing history  Description of all stages of production 
B223 Distribution and location of products after 
delivery 
Description of transport, handling and storage of products 
after the production is finished 
B229 Traceability requirements, n.e.s.B230 
Tolerance limits for residues or restricted use of 
certain substances 
Maximum concentration or restrictions to use certain 
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B231 Tolerance limits for residues or 
contamination by certain substances 
Maximum limits for toxic and other harmful substances and 
contaminants that enter the product during the production 
process. 
B232 Restricted use of certain substances  Restriction on the use of certain substances as components 
or additives, which are therefore reasonably expected to 
exist in the final product. As a result, their specification is 
also important to prevent the risks arising from their use 
B240 Regulation on genetically modified 
organisms (for reasons other than food safety) 
Restriction on imports if genetically modified organisms are 
used in the production. 
B250 Identity requirement  Conditions to be satisfied in order to identify a product with 
a certain denomination (e.g. minimum, percentage content 
of an ingredient that gives the name to the final product 
such as cocoa content in "chocolate")cocoa) 
B260 Environment-specific requirement  Conditions or requirements that aim to prevent 
environmental damage or ensure protection of the 
environment. 
B270 Other product characteristics 
requirements 
B280 Other production process requirements 
B290 Technical regulations n.e.s. 
 
B300 Conformity assessment related to TBT 
 
Control, inspection and approval procedure, including 
procedures for sampling, testing and inspection, evaluation, 
verification and assurance of conformity, and accreditation 
and approval 
B310 Certification requirement  Certification requirements either in the exporting or 
importing country 
B311 Certification by government agencies of the 
countries of origin 
Requirement to obtain certifications from the exporting 
country 
B312 Certification by local agencies in the 
destination market 
Requirement to obtain certifications from the importing 
country 
B320 Lack of recognition  Certifications issued by a country or authority are not 
recognized by the importing country. 
B321 Lack of acceptance of internationally 
recognized accredited conformity assessment 
bodies 
International certifications are not recognized by the 
importing country. 
B322 Lack of acceptance of certificates of 
conformity assessment bodies issued in the 
country of origin 
Certifications from exporters are not recognized by the 
importing country. 
B323 Lack of acceptance of Self Declaration of 
Conformity (SDoC) 
SDoC: procedure by which a supplier provides a written 
assurance that a product conforms to specified requirements 
B329 Lack of recognition, n.e.s.B330 Testing 
requirement 
Includes sampling requirement and are usually associated 
to testing or laboratory fees 
B340 Inspection and clearance requirement  Imports require inspection and/or clearance to be accepted. 
Inspection can be done by public or private entities. 
B350 Registration requirement  Importers may need to be registered in the importing 
country. It is often the case for sensitive products that may 
be related to security issues. Exporters need to contact a 
registered importer. 
B360 Repetition in destination market of 
identical tests for same or equivalent regulations 
For a given regulation, a same test must be performed 
within a destination country at national, regional and/or 
local entry points 
B370 Translation requirement for reports or 
certificates 
Documents must be translated to the language of the 
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B380 Requirement to pass through specified 
entry point or customs 
Certain goods must be cleared at a specific entry point 
within a destination country for availability of testing or 
inspection facility 
B390 Conformity assessment related to TBT 
n.e.s. 
B900 Technical barriers to trade, n.e.s. 
 
C000 OTHER TECHNICAL MEASURES 
 
 
C100 Pre-shipment inspection  A physical inspection of goods before they are shipped in 
the country of export, which establishes the exact nature of 
the goods. The inspection assures that the goods are in 
accordance with the accompanying documents that specify 
their customs tariff code, quality, quantity and price. 
C200 Special custom formalities not related to 
SPS/TBT 
Formalities to be fulfilled at the customs, which are not 
related to the administration of SPS/TBT measures 
C210 Documentation requirement  Requirement to produce any document used to declare 
shipments to Customs in the country of import 
C220 Direct consignment requirement  Goods must be shipped directly from the country of origin, 
without stopping at a third country 
C230 Requirement to pass through specified port 
of customs 
Goods must pass through a designated entry point and/ or 
customs office, which might slow down the import clearance 
process. 
C240 Transportation restrictions  Particular transportations conditions, norms or laws 
stipulated by National Authorities of each country that may 
be considered as restrictive 
C241 Restrictive Air transportations regulations 
C242 Restrictive Sea transportations regulations 
C243 Restrictive land transportations 
regulations 
C290 Special custom formalities not related to 
SPS/TBT, n.e.s. 
C900 Technical Measures n.e.s. 
 
D000 PRICE CONTROL MEASURES  Price control measures are implemented to control the 
prices of imported articles in order to: support the domestic 
price of certain products when the import price of these 
goods are lower; establish the domestic price of certain 
products because of price fluctuation in domestic markets, 
or price instability in a foreign market; and counteract the 
damage resulting from the occurrence of "unfair" foreign 
trade practices. 
D100 Administrative pricing  By administrative price fixing, the authorities of the 
importing country take into account the domestic prices of 
the producer or consumer; establish floor and ceiling price 
limits; or revert to determined international market values. 
There may be different price fixing methods, such as 
minimum import prices or prices set according to a 
reference 
D110 Minimum import prices  Pre-established import price below which imports cannot 
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D120 Reference prices and other price controls  Pre-established import price which authorities of the 
importing country use as reference to set a floor or ceiling 
price 
D190 Administrative pricing n.e.s. 
 
 
D200 Voluntary export price restraint  A Voluntary export price restraint is an arrangement in 
which the exporter agrees to keep the price of his goods 
above a certain level. 
D300 Variable charges  Variable charges are taxes or levies aimed at bringing the 
market prices of imported agricultural and food products in 
line with the prices of corresponding domestic products 2. 
Primary commodities may be charged per total weight, 
while charges on processed foodstuffs can be levied in 
proportion to the primary product contents in the final 
product. These charges include: 
D310 Variable levies  The rate of tax varies inversely with the price of imports. 
These charges are applied mainly to primary products. It 
may be called flexible import fee. 
D320 Variable components  The tax includes a fixed component and a variable 
component. These charges are applied mainly to processed 
products where the variable part is applied on the primary 
products or ingredients included the final product. It may be 
called compensatory element. 
D390 Variable charges n.e.s 
 
 
D400 Antidumping measures  Antidumping measures are taken against a dumping action 
of an exporter. It is considered that dumping takes place 
when a product is introduced into the commerce of an 
importing country at less than its normal value, i.e. if the 
export price of the product exported is less than the 
comparable price, in the ordinary course of trade, for the 
like product when destined for consumption in the exporting 
country.  
D410 Antidumping investigations  Antidumping investigations are initiated either following a 
complaint by local producers of similar goods or self-
initiated by importing country authorities when they have 
cause to believe that dumping may be materially injurious to 
national competing producers or third parties' exporters. 
Provisional duties may be applied during the investigation. 
D420 Antidumping duties  Antidumping duties are levied on certain goods originating 
from specific trading partner(s) to offset the dumping 
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D430 Price undertakings  Undertakings to increase the export price may be offered by 
exporters to avoid the imposition of antidumping duties. 
Under WTO rules, prices can be negotiated for this purpose, 
but only after the dumping has been proved. 
D500 Countervailing measures  Countervailing measures are intended to offset any direct or 
indirect subsidy granted by authorities in the exporting 
country. These may take the form of countervailing duties or 
undertakings by the exporting firms or by authorities of the 
subsidizing country. 
D510 Countervailing investigations  Countervailing investigations are initiated either following 
a complaint by local producers of similar goods or self-
initiated by the importing country authority to determine 
whether the imported goods are subsidized and cause 
material injury. 
D520 Countervailing duties  Duties levied on certain goods to offset the amount of 
subsidization granted by the exporter on the production or 
trade of these goods, when the subsidy is assumed to hurt 
domestic industry. 
D530 Price undertakings  Undertakings to increase the export price may be offered by 
exporters to avoid the imposition of countervailing duties. 
Under WTO rules, prices can be negotiated for this purpose, 
but only after the injurious effect of the subsidy has been 
proved. 
D600 Safeguard duties  Emergency and/or temporary duties imposed as a safeguard 
action. A country may take a “safeguard” action (i.e., 
restrict imports of a product temporarily) to protect a 
specific domestic industry from an increase in imports of 
any product which is causing, or which is threatening to 
cause, serious injury to the domestic industry that produces 
like or directly competitive products. 
D700 Seasonal duties  Seasonal duties are applicable at certain times of the year, 
usually in connection with agricultural products. 
D900 Price control measures n.e.s.   
E000 QUANTITY CONTROL MEASURES  Quantity control measures are aimed at restraining the 
quantity of goods that can be imported, regardless of 
whether they come from different sources or one specific 
supplier. These measures can take the form of restrictive 
licensing, fixing of a predetermined quota, or through 
prohibitions. 
(Most quantity control measures are formally prohibited by 
the GATT 1994, but can be applied under specifically 
determined circumstances (Article XI)) 
E100 Non-automatic licence  This licence is and import licence, which is not granted 
automatically. The licence may either be issued on a 
discretionary basis or may require specific criteria to be met 
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E110 Licence with no specific ex-ante criteria  This licence, which is sometimes also referred to as a 
discretionary licence, is issued at the discretion of the 
issuing authority. 
E120 Licence for specified use  This licence is limited to operations generating anticipated 
benefit in important domains of the economy, such as export 
production, investment projects, etc. 
E130 Licence linked with local production  This licence requires the compulsory linkage of imports with 
local market outputs. 
E140 Licence combined with or replaced by 
special import authorization 
In addition to or instead of a licence issued by the main 
licensing body (usually the ministry of trade), a special 
import authorization or an inscription in a register is 
required by a specialized authority which is coordinating a 
sector of the domestic economy (ministry of industry, 
ministry of agriculture, etc). 
E150 Licence for non-economic reasons  This licence is granted for political, religious reasons, or 
others, which hare not economic. 
E151 Licence for political reasons  This licence is issued for political reasons rather than 
economic. 
E159 Licence for non-economic reasons, n.e.s. 
E190 Non-automatic licensing n.e.s. 
 
 
E200 Quotas  Quotas involve restricting the importation of specified 
products through the setting of a maximum quantity or value 
of goods authorized for import. The different forms of 
quotas are: 
E210 Global quotas  Global quotas are quotas established on the basis of the 
total quantity or value of imports of specific products, which 
can be filled on a first-come, first-served basis, or pre-
allocated to different suppliers 
E211 Unallocated quotas  Quotas that are filled on a first-come, first-served basis 
without allocating among exporters 
E212 Allocated to exporting countries  Quotas which are pre-allocated among potential exporters 
E220 Bilateral quotas  Quotas of imports reserved for a specific country 
E230 Seasonal quotas  Quotas of imports for a given period of the year, usually set 
for certain agricultural goods. 
E240 Quotas linked with purchase of local goods  Quotas defined as a percentage of the value of similar 
locally purchased goods. 
E250 Quotas for non-economic reasons  Quotas for other reasons, rather than economic. 
E251 Quota for political reasons  Quotas that are granted on the basis of political rather than 
economic reasons. 
E259 Quotas for non-economic reasons, n.e.s. 
 
 
E260 Tariff Rate Quotas  A system of multiple tariff rates applicable to a same 
product. The lower tariff rates apply up to a quota of 
imports, and the higher rates are charged on imports which 
exceed the quota amount. Quota may be defined in terms of 
quantity or value. 
E270 Quotas linked with domestic production  Compulsory linkage of imports (of materials or parts) with 
localproduction15 
E290 Quotas n.e.s.   
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E310 Total prohibition (not for SPS reasons) 
 
Prohibition without any additional conditions or 
qualifications 
E320 Suspension of issuance of licences  The suspension of issuance of licences is a form of de facto 
prohibition. This situation may arise in cases related to 
short-term balance-of payments difficulties, or for other 
reasons. 
E330 Seasonal prohibition  Seasonal prohibition involves the prohibition of imports 
during a given period of the year. This is usually applied to 
certain agricultural products. 
E340 Temporary prohibition  This prohibition is set only for a limited period of time, 
though it may not refer to a fixed ending date. It is usually 
for urgent matters. 
E350 Prohibition of importation in bulk  Requirement that products must be imported in small 
packages or containers 
E360 Prohibition of products infringing patents 
or intellectual property rights 
Prohibition of copies, counterfeits or imitations of patented 
or trademarked products 
E370 Prohibition for non-economic reasons  Prohibitions for political, religious reasons, or others, 
which are not economic. 
E371 Prohibition for religious, moral or cultural 
reasons 
Some countries will prohibit the import, use, or possession 
of any item that is held to be contrary to the tenets of their 
Faith. This could include non religious materials, pork, 
alcohol products and illicit drugs or any other item that 
could be contrary to religion precepts. Any product that is 
related to pork even if it's not used as food like pig skin is 
still prohibited in some countries. 
E372 Prohibition for political reasons (Embargo)  Prohibition of imports from a country or group of countries, 
applied for political reasons. 
E379 Prohibition for non-economic reasons, 
n.e.s. 
E390 Prohibitions n.e.s. 
 
E400 Quantitative safeguard measures 
 
Measures having effect on quantitative restrictions. 
Quantitative safeguard measures are adopted when the 
government of the importing country wishes to prevent or 
remedy serious injuries resulting from a sudden increase of 
imports, or to facilitate adjustment. 
E500 Export restraint arrangement  An arrangement by which an exporter agrees to limit 
exports in order to avoid imposition of restrictions by the 
importing country, such as quotas, raised tariffs or any 
other import controls5. The arrangement may be concluded 
at either government or industry level. 
E510 Voluntary export restraint arrangements 
(VERs) 
Voluntary export restraints are arrangements made by 
government or industry of an exporting country to 
voluntarily limit exports in order to avoid imposition of 
mandatory restrictions by the importing country. 
E511 Quota agreement  Export quotas, which a given exporting country would 
accept from an importing country to avoid imposition of 
mandatory restrictions 
E512 Consultation agreement  Agreement that includes provisions for consultation with a 
view to introducing restrictions under certain circumstances 
E513 Administrative co-operation agreement  Agreement that includes provisions for administrative 
cooperation with a view to avoiding disruptions in bilateral 
trade. 
E590 Export restraint arrangements n.e.s. 
E900 Quantity control measures n.e.s. 
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F000 PARA-TARIFF MEASURES  Other measures that increase the cost of imports in a 
manner similar to tariff measures, i.e. by fixed percentage 
or by a fixed amount, calculated respectively on the basis of 
the value and the quantity, are known as para-tariff 
measures. Four groups are distinguished: customs 
surcharges; additional taxes and charges; internal taxes 
and charges levied on imports; and decreed custom 
valuation. 
F100 Customs Surcharges  Customs surcharges, which are also called surtax or 
additional duty, is an ad hoc trade policy instrument to raise 
fiscal revenues or to protect domestic industries. 
F200 Additional taxes and charges  Additional charges, which are levied on imported goods in 
addition to customs duties and surcharges and which have 
no internal equivalent, and which comprise various taxes 
and fees. The category of additional charges includes the 
tax on foreign exchange transactions, stamp tax, import 
licence fee, consular invoice fee, statistical tax, tax on 
transport facilities and charges for sensitive product 
categories. Various other taxes, such as the export 
promotion fund tax, taxes for the special funds, the 
municipal tax, registration fee on imported motor vehicles, 
customs formality tax, etc., are classified as additional 
charges, n.e.s. 
F210 Tax on foreign exchange transactions 
F220 Stamp tax 
F230 Import licence fee 
F240 Consular invoice fee 
F250 Statistical tax 
F260 Merchandise handling or storing fees 
F270 Tax on transport facilities 
F280 Taxes and charges for sensitive product 
categories 
F290 Additional charges n.e.s. 
 
Article III of the GATT Agreement allows internal taxes to 
be applied to imports; however, these taxes should not be 
higher than those applied to similar domestic products.  
F300 Internal taxes and charges levied on imports   
F310 General sales taxes  The general sales tax levied on imports is the equivalent of 
those internal taxes that are applied to all or most products. 
Three types of internal axes can be distinguished: first, the 
one commonly known as sales tax, which is an ad valorem 
tax based on the gross receipts of sales of goods, collected 
at regular intervals from traders; secondly, the turnover tax 
or multiple sales tax, which is a tax imposed at more than 
one level of production and distribution and is based on 
gross receipts, resulting in a accumulation of taxes; thirdly, 
the value-added tax which is a modified turnover tax based 
on the net value added instead of on the gross receipts, 
avoiding accumulation of taxes and not affecting the price 
structure and the allocation of resources. 
F330 Taxes and charges for sensitive product 
categories 
 
F390 Internal taxes and charges levied on 
imports n.e.s. 
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F400 Decreed Customs Valuations  Customs duties and other charges on selected imports can 
be levied on the basis of a decreed value of goods (the so-
called "valeur mercuriale" in French). This practice is 
presented as a means to avoid fraud or to protect domestic 
industry. The decreed value de facto transforms an ad-
valorem duty into a specific duty. 
F900 Para-tariff measures n.e.s   
G000 FINANCE MEASURES  Financial measures are intended to regulate the access to 
and cost of foreign exchange for imports and define the 
terms of payment. They may increase import costs in the 
same manner as tariff measures. 
G100 Advance payment requirement  Advance payment requirements related to the value of the 
import transaction and/or related import taxes, are made at 
the time an application is lodged, or when an import licence 
is issued. These payment requirements can consist of: 
G110 Advance import deposit  Advance import deposits require the importer to deposit a 
percentage of the value of the import transaction before 
receiving the goods. No interest is paid on these deposits. 
G120 Cash margin requirement  Cash margin requirements entail depositing the total 
amount of the transaction value in a foreign currency, or a 
specified part of it, in a commercial bank, before the 
opening of a letter of credit. 
G130 Advance payment of customs duties  Advance payment of custom duties entails paying all or part 
of the customs duties in advance; no interest in paid on 
these advance payments. 
G140 Refundable deposits for sensitive product 
categories 
Refundable deposits are charges which are refunded when 
the used products or the containers they came in are 
returned to a collection system. 
G190 Advance payment requirements n.e.s.   
G200 Multiple exchange rates  Varying exchange rates for imports, depending on the 
product category. Usually, the official rate is reserved for 
essential commodities while the other goods must be paid at 
commercial rates or occasionally by buying foreign 
exchange through auctions. 
G300 Restrictive official foreign exchange 
allocation 
These restrictions are usually executed by the central bank 
in the form of permits, visas, authorizations, etc, and are 
intended to control import flows. Foreign exchange 
allocation is sometimes prohibited under this measure. 
G310 Prohibition of foreign exchange allocation  No official foreign exchange allocations available to pay for 
imports. 
G320 Bank authorization  A special authorization needs to be obtained from the 
central bank. 
G330 Licence linked with non-official foreign 
exchange 
A licence is granted if official foreign exchange is not 
required. 
G331 External foreign exchange  A licence is granted only for imports required for technical 
assistance projects and other sources of external foreign 
exchange. 
G332 Importers' own foreign exchange  A licence is granted if importers have foreign exchange held 
in an overseas bank. 
G339 Licence linked with non-official foreign 
exchange, n.e.s. 
G390 Restrictive official foreign exchange 
allocation, n.e.s. 
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G400 Regulations concerning terms of payment 
for imports 
 
These regulations cover the terms of payment of imports and 
the obtaining and use of credit (foreign or domestic) to 
finance imports. 
G500 Transfer delays, queuing  Transfer delays and queuing relate to the maximum 
permitted delays between the date that goods have been 
delivered and the date of the final settlement of the imported 
goods (usually 90, 180 or 360 days for consumer goods and 
industrial inputs and two to five years for capital goods). 
Queuing takes place when the prescribed delays cannot be 
observed because of foreign exchange shortages, and when 
transactions are settled after a longer delay. 
G600 Surrender requirement  This requirement relates to the surrender of foreign 
exchange earnings to the central bank. 
G900 Finance measures n.e.s.   
H000 ANTI-COMPETITIVE MEASURES  Measures to grant exclusive or special preferences or 
privileges to one or more limited group of economic 
operators, for social, fiscal, economic or political reasons. 
H100 Single channel for imports  The requirement that all imports, or imports of selected 
commodities, have to be channelled through state-owned 
agencies or state-controlled enterprises. The private sector 
is sometimes also granted exclusive import rights. 
H110 State trading administration, for importing 
H120 Sole importing agency 
H190 Single channel for imports, n.e.s. 
 
H200 Compulsory national service  Compulsory national service consists of government-backed 
exclusive rights of national insurance and shipping 
companies on all or a specified share of imports. 
H210 Compulsory national insurance 
H220 Compulsory national transport 
H290 Compulsory national service, n.e.s. 
H900 Anti-competitive measures, n.e.s. 
 
I000 EXPORT RELATED MEASURES  Export-related measures are measures applied by the 
government of the exporting country on exported goods. 
I100 Export taxes  Export taxes/duties are taxes collected on goods or 
commodities by the government of the exporting country. 
Export taxes can be set either on a specific or an ad valorem 
basis 
I200 Export quantitative restriction  Restrictions to the quantity of goods exported to a specific 
country or countries by the government of the exporting 
country for reasons such as: shortage of goods in the 
domestic market; avoiding antidumping measures; or for 
political reasons. 
I210 Export Prohibition  Prohibition of exports of certain products 
I220 Export quotas  Quotas that limit value or volume of exports. 
I230 Licensing or permit requirements to export  Exporters are required to obtain licensing or permit by the 
government of the exporting country to export products. 
I240 Registration, tight regulation or restriction 
to export 
Requirement to register products before being exported (for 
monitoring purposes) 
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I300 Certification  Requirement by the exporting country to obtain sanitary, 
phytosanitary or other certification before the goods are 
exported 
I400 Inspection fee  A fee levied by the government authority of exporting 
country to cover the cost of inspection for exporting 
products 
I500 State trading administration  All or parts of exports of selected commodities have to be 
channelled through specific enterprises identified by 
governments. 
I600 Dual pricing schemes  Different prices for products are applied depending on 
whether they are sold on domestic market or export markets. 
I900 Export measures n.e.s.   
J000 TRADE-RELATED INVESTMENT 
MEASURES 
 
J100 Local content measures  Requirement to use certain minimum levels of locally made 
component, which restrict the level of imported components. 
J200 Trade balancing measures  Measures limiting the purchase or use of imported products 
by an enterprise to an amount related to the volume or value 
of local products that it exports 
J900 Trade-related investment measures, n.e.s   
K000 DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTIONS*  Restriction to limit and rule the way the products are 
distributed. It may be controlled through additional license 
or certification requirement. 
L000 RESTRICTION ON POST-SALES 
SERVICES* 
Measures restricting producers of exported goods in 
exporting countries to provide post sales service in the 
importing country 
M000 SUBSIDIES*  Financial contribution by a government or government body 
to a production structure, being a particular industry or 
company, such as direct transfer of funds or potential 
transfer of funds (e.g. grants, loans, equity infusions), 
payments to a funding mechanism and income or price 
support. 
N000 GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT 
RESTRICTIONS* 
Measures controlling the purchase of goods by government 
agencies, generally by preferring national providers 
O000 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY*  Intellectual property legislation covers patents, trademarks, 
industrial designs, lay-out designs of integrated circuits, 
copyright, geographical indications and trade secrets. 
P000 RULES OF ORIGIN*  Rules of origin cover laws, regulations and administrative 
determinations of general application applied by 
government of importing countries to determine the country 
of origin of goods. Rules of origin can restrict trade when it 
is difficult to determine the origin of the final product if raw 
materials and parts come from different countries. Rules of 
origin are important in implementing such trade policy 
instruments as antidumping and countervailing duties, 
origin marking, and safeguard measures. 
 
* Until further decision by MAST members, no efforts will be made to collect measures under these categories from 
official sources. These categories have been created in order to reflect potential concerns by traders through 
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Classification of procedural obstacles 
A:ARBITRARINESS OR INCONSISTENCY 
1.  Behaviour of public officials 
2.  Product classification and/or valuation 
3.  Application of procedure, regulation, or requirement (including inconsistencies between 
local and national procedure or regulation) 
B: DISCRIMINATORY BEHAVIOUR FAVOURING SPECIFIC PRODUCERS OR SUPPLIERS 
1.  Local suppliers or producers in destination market 
2.   Suppliers from other countries 
3.  Large (or small) companies 
C: INEFFICIENCY OR OBSTRUCTION 
1.  Excessive documentation requirement 
2.  Strict/detailed/redundant testing, certification or labelling 
3.  Administrative delay (e.g. in authorisation, approval) 
4.  Complex clearances mechanism (e.g. several entities have to approve) 
5.  Short submission deadlines for required information or forms 
6.  Outdated procedures, (e.g. lack of automation) 
Lack of resources, (e.g. understaffing, scarce equipment in destination market) 
D: NON-TRANSPARENCY 
1.  Inadequate information on laws/ regulations/registration 
2.  Unannounced change of procedure, regulation or requirement  
3.  Lack of inquiry point 
4.  Non-transparent government bid or reimbursement process 
5.  Non-transparent dispute resolution 
6.  Informal payment expected or required 
E: LEGAL ISSUES 
1.  Lack of enforcement, e.g. patents, copyrights, trademarks, confidentiality 
2.  Inadequate due process/appeals process/dispute resolution 
3.  Inadequate legal infrastructure 
F: UNUSUALLY HIGH FEES OR CHARGES (e.g. for stamp, testing or other services rendered) 
 A COST-BENEFIT FRAMEWORK FOR THE ASSESSMENT OF NON-TARIFF MEASURES IN AGRO-FOOD TRADE – 69 
 
 
OECD FOOD, AGRICULTURE AND FISHERIES WORKING PAPERS N°21 @ OECD 2009 
Appendix 2.  
 
Derivation of Market Equilibria and Welfare Measures  
This appendix provides details on the derivation of the consumer demand functions and gives 
the analytical expressions for the calculation of welfare effects for the different cases discussed in the 
main text. 
The inverse demand for indifferent and concerned consumers 
Recall the utility function (1): 
2 ( , ) /2 i i i i i i i i U q w aq bq Ir q w      
Maximization of (1) under the budget constraint i i i pq w y , where  i y  denotes the income of person i, 
leads to the following inverse demand function ii p a bq I r     . The corresponding demand for the 
consumer i is  ( ) ( )/ ii q p a p I r b     . Aggregate demand over all consumers is then 
1 ()
N
i i Q q p
   leading to
1 ( )/ /
N
i i Q N a p b I r b
     . By assuming / b b N  , inverting 
aggregate demand leads to the inverse demand function 
1 ( , ) ( )/
N D
i i p Q I a bQ I r N
     .  (1‟) 
We assume that a proportion β=N1/N of consumers are completely indifferent to the specific 
characteristic, with  0 i r   for every i=1,.., N1. The proportion (1-β) = 1-N1/N of consumers is reluctant 
to consume the specific characteristic and associate a damage per unit consumed equal to  2 r  across all 
this subgroup. In this case, it is possible to divide the previous aggregate demand in two subgroup 
demands, with 
1
11 1 ( ) ( ) ( )/
N D
i i Q p q p N a p b
      for the consumers indifferent to the negative 
characteristic, and   
1 ()
2 1 2 1 ( , ) ( ) ( ) /
NN D
i i Q p I q p N N a p I r b

         for the concerned 
consumers. With / b b N  , N1= βN and (N-N1)=(1-β)N, the respective inverse demands are given by (2) 
in the main text. 
 
Welfare 
For each configuration, domestic welfare is derived by considering surplus areas associated with supply 
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Consumption-based externalities directly linked to consumption 
Prohibitive standard (import ban)  
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Free Trade 
Analytical expressions at the equilibrium under free trade are  
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Free trade with a mandatory label 
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Production-based externality. 
Analytical expressions at the equilibrium under free trade are  
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Global commons externality 
Analytical expressions at the equilibrium under free trade are  
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